| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| pretix offloads certain processes to background tasks that are run by a different server to avoid HTTP workers being clogged with processes that take longer than a usual web request. The browser periodically polls the server to see if the task is already finished using a UUID-shaped task ID. Once the task is completed, pretix resumes to the next step of the operation based on the result of the task. The system does however not check if the result stems from the correct type of task. Therefore, an attacker can supply the UUID of a task of a different type and pretix will continue with the result from the wrong task. In most cases, this will just result in an error because the return types do not match up, but in some cases this can be abused to extract objects the attacker usually should not see. Specifically, a vector was discovered that allowed to abuse this for unauthorized access to other people's ticket purchases. The attacker can, however, not control which purchases they get access to. |
| When configuring a device to use the security profile "pretixSCAN (kiosk mode, no order sync, no search)", the API search endpoint introduced in pretix 4.12 was not blocked correctly. This theoretically allows these devices to perform searches for orders even if that was not intended. If the device is in kiosk mode, the search button will still be hidden from users. |
| Our payment integration with Stripe did not properly validate payment status responses. An attacker could use a successful payment status response from one payment and supply it to the system for a different payment, gaining access to multiple valid tickets with only one payment. However, the attack requires knowledge of a valid charge ID from the same event which we believe is usually not exposed to users.
To simplify attack surface, the fix removes support for incoming webhooks regarding payments created through Stripe's old "source" API. pretix stopped creating payments using this API in 2024.1 for most payment methods and in 2024.9 for all payment methods. |
| A legacy code path allowed users to craft requests to a ticket shop that bypass some validation steps for the selected products. In consequence, this could lead to an attacker purchasing products that are in fact sold out. |
| When a ticket holder opens the ticket page of a ticket that is an add-on (possible since 2026.9) the HTML content of the page contains the secret link to the parent product, creating a potential data leak. Under different specific conditions, when a ticket contains user-uploaded files in response to a question, the page can even contain the secret link to the entire order. |
| When a scheduled export is copied, the permissions of the original export's owner are used when running the export. This allows users to create exports with data they usually shouldn't be able to see, but only within events they already have permissions to. |
| Our payment integration with Adyen did not properly validate payment status responses. An attacker could use a successful payment status response from one payment and supply it to the system for a different payment, gaining access to multiple valid tickets with only one payment. |
| pretix provides a mechanism where ticket QR codes are cryptographically signed and can be verified by our pretixSCAN apps in offline mode without any database of valid tickets. pretixSCAN checks the signature to verify that the ticket was issued by the correct pretix event and compares the QR code against a list of revoked QR codes. A QR code becomes revoked when the order is canceled, or the ticket is changed in a way that a new QR code needs to be generated.
However, the parsing of the QR code in all of our pretixSCAN apps contained a faulty computation, rendering the check for the correct length of the contents faulty. This way, an attacker is able to craft multiple QR codes for the same ticket which have the same content, but look different and therefore do not match against the revocation list. This does not allow to fabricate entirely new tickets, but it does allow to enter the event with e.g. a canceled ticket. This attack requires pretixSCAN to be scanning in offline mode and the "pretix signature scheme 1" to be used for the event's QR codes.
If the attack is executed, the ticket unfortunately shows as valid (green) on the scanner but as invalid (red) on the server since the server later cannot match it to a ticket. We scanned the entire database of scans on pretix Hosted and could not find any traces of this being exploited in the past. |
| pretixSCAN Proxy does not use a secure random generator to generate initialization tokens and API keys for the connection between pretixSCAN devices and the pretixSCAN Proxy. This could allow a skilled attacker with access to at least some of the tokens to predict the value of other tokens more easily.
pretixSCAN is usually used on local networks and the level of exposure heavily depends on the structure of that network. If you want to be extra careful, it might make sense to reconnect your devices to the proxy after the update. |
| Our WordPress plugin for the pretix Widget performs HTTP calls to pre-fetch CSS and JS files into a local cache and stores them publicly on the WordPress instance. These HTTP calls are made with wp_remote_get, not wp_safe_remote_get, and therefore allow SSRF with body extraction. Exploiting this requires sufficient WordPress permissions to create or modify pages. |
| When changing the settings of a scheduled export, no permission checks are done to see whether the user making the change has access to the exporter after the change. This way, an attacker with access to change organizer settings and e.g. access to all orders could change the export to refer to gift cards instead, even if they do not have access to gift cards.
The fix for this is technically a breaking API change, since changing the export type of existing scheduled exports is no longer allowed, but we don't expect this to affect any typical API usage. |
| Our API endpoint for changing ticket layouts did not properly check permissions of the requesting user or API token. An attacker with read-only access to an event could use this to change the event's ticket layout. |
| The mechanism binding files generated during a shredding process to the authentication method is not working correctly and the same session token is used for all token-based API users. This is similar to an issue fixed in 2026.7.1 but was missed while creating the fix. Since the files are referred to by randomly generated UUIDs and only exist for a day, there is virtually no risk, but it renders the added protection mechanism useless. As part of the fix, we have also improved hardening of some other related code areas. |
| Some of our API endpoints allowed to create order payments referencing a gift card by using the auto-incremented internal ID. This ID was not checked and allowed creating payments that reference gift cards from different organizers and thereby obtaining their secret. The gift card is not charged in this case, but by then triggering a refund on the payment, one can increase the value of the gift card. |
| When pretix is used as the identity provider in a Single-Sign-On (SSO) setup for customer accounts, the system did not properly validate the `response_type` requested in an authorization request against the configured grant type of the SSO client. This means that if an SSO client was configured to only allow the `code` response type, which requires knowledge of the client secret to use and would wrongfully send a response type like `id_token`, it would receive back a valid token. Exploiting this requires the attacker to run JavaScript on the page specified by `redirect_uri`, which must be from a list specified in the client configuration. |
| A logic flaw in the checkout flow allows users to bypass validations performed during the check-in by skipping entire check-in steps. |
| A missing permission check allowed low-privileged users with access to an event but without access to the event's orders to extract some specific information. This information includes the number of attendees and the total revenue. |
| If an attacker is able to convince a victim on a specially crafted link, the victim is logged in to the attacker's customer account. If the victim does not notice this, this might lead to their order details being stored into the attacker's account. The attack only works when the event is available on a different domain than the organizer page. |
| The mechanism binding API-uploaded files to the uploader's authentication method is not working correctly and the same session token is used for all token-based API users. Since API-uploaded files are refered to by randomly generated UUIDs and only exist for a day, there is virtually no risk, but it renders the added protection mechanism useless. |
| Malicious HTML content could be injected into the help texts of various fields with organizer permissions. |