| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Use after free in Animation in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker to read memory inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb()
l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() returned l2cap_pi(sk)->chan after
release_sock(parent). Once the parent lock is dropped the newly
enqueued child socket sk is reachable via the accept queue, so another
task can accept and free it before the callback dereferences sk,
resulting in a use-after-free.
Rework the ->new_connection() op so the core, rather than the callback,
owns the child channel's lifetime. The op now receives a pre-allocated
new_chan and returns an errno instead of allocating and returning a
channel. l2cap_new_connection() allocates the child channel and links
it into the conn list via __l2cap_chan_add() before invoking the
callback, so the conn-list reference keeps the channel alive once
release_sock(parent) exposes the socket to other tasks.
Channel configuration that was duplicated in l2cap_sock_init() and the
various new_connection callbacks is consolidated into
l2cap_chan_set_defaults(), which now inherits from the parent channel
when one is supplied. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Check for invalid/obsolete root *after* making MMU pages available
Check for a "stale" page fault, i.e. for an invalid and/or obsolete root,
after making MMU pages available for the shadow MMU. If reclaiming shadow
pages zaps an in-use root, i.e. marks it invalid, then KVM will attempt to
map memory into an invalid root. On its own, populating an invalid root is
"fine", but because child shadow pages inherit their parent's role, any
children created during the map/fetch will be created as invalid pages,
thus violating KVM's invariant that invalid pages are never on the list of
active MMU pages.
Note, the underlying flaw has existed since KVM first started tracking
invalid roots in 2008 (commit 2e53d63acba7, "KVM: MMU: ignore zapped root
pagetables"), but the true badness only came along in 2020 (Linux 5.9)
with the invariant that invalid shadow pages can't be on the list of
active pages.
Note #2, inheriting role.invalid when creating child shadow pages is also
far from ideal; that flaw will be addressed separately. |
| blueprintUE Self-Hosted Edition before 4.3.6 contains an iframe injection vulnerability that allows authenticated users to embed arbitrary third-party content by abusing the PeerTube video URL matcher in BlueprintService::findVideoProvider(). Attackers can set a blueprint video URL on an attacker-controlled host, which site.js loads in an unsandboxed iframe after consent, framing fake login forms or malware downloads. |
| Use after free in MediaStream in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Layout in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical) |
| Use after free in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Frames in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in DOM in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Browser in Google Chrome on on Windows prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in HTML in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Frames in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Media in Google Chrome on on Android prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Extensions in Google Chrome on on Windows prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Core in Google Chrome on on Windows prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen-netback: Fix UAF when reading statistics data
The network statistic data in the driver is protected by RCU.
Unfortunately when tearing down the queues after an error during
connecting to the frontend (e.g. due to illegal Xenstore data filled
in by the guest), the statistic data is being freed without
synchronizing the RCU state. In case the data is being read via sysfs
in this phase, access to already freed memory or memory being in new
use is possible.
Fix that by calling synchronize_net() before freeing the queue data.
This is XSA-526 / CVE-2026-100080 |
| Nokogiri is an open source XML and HTML library for the Ruby programming language. Prior to 1.19.5, the CRuby native extension can leave Ruby wrappers pointing to freed memory when Nokogiri::XML::Node#[]= or Nokogiri::XML::Node#lang= replaces an existing attribute value after code has accessed the attribute's child nodes. Replacing the value frees native child nodes while their wrappers remain reachable, and later use of those wrappers can cause an invalid read or process segfault. JRuby is not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.19.5. |
| ModSecurity is an open source, cross platform web application firewall (WAF) engine for Apache, IIS and Nginx. From 3.0.15 until 3.0.17, XML request body processing with SecParseXmlIntoArgs set to On or OnlyArgs can leave XMLNodes::parsing_ctx_arg uninitialized in the SAX end-element callback. A single crafted unauthenticated HTTP request can make a worker dereference the pointer, resulting in a constant-value write to an attacker-controlled address. The resulting memory corruption can terminate the worker and may disclose memory or redirect execution. Earlier 3.0.x releases and ModSecurity 2.x do not use the affected path. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.17. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit
handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing
req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between
handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file().
The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps
struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when
the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears
the socket down regardless of any sock_hold.
Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an
explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit().
handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the
reference on the completion-bit-winning path.
The submit error path must also release the file reference, but
after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can
discover the request and race the error path. Gate the error-path
cleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction
-- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same
serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel()
already use. When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit
error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown
handles final destruction.
The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change
comes in the next patch. |