| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, and 1.6.1, bws_srv_start() in ports/linux/websocket-srv.c builds the libwebsockets server context with a CA certificate loaded but never sets LWS_SERVER_OPTION_REQUIRE_VALID_OPENSSL_CLIENT_CERT, so the hub accepts TLS connections from clients presenting no certificate at all. Any network-reachable host can join the BACnet/SC mesh without credentials. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, 1.6.1, and 1.7.0. |
| NVIDIA OpenShell for Linux contains a vulnerability in its gateway-to-sandbox transport where a network attacker positioned on the internal path could intercept credentials and tamper with commands and data because the transport accepts any host key without verification, permitting a machine-in-the-middle to impersonate the sandbox endpoint. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to information disclosure, data tampering, and code execution. |
| Improper certificate validation in Windows Active Directory Certificate Services allows an authorized attacker to bypass a security feature over a network. |
| Improper certificate validation in CP prior to SMR Nov-2026 Release 1 allows local privileged attackers to bypass SIM lock. |
| IBM API Connect 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive credentials and manipulate tool responses due to improper certificate validation. |
| Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.3.4 through 6.3.7, with a MySQL or MariaDB database, TlsMode=verify-full and no TlsCaFile, does not verify the database server's certificate's issuer or name when the connection is one that MariaDB Connector/C treats as local - Server= set to 127.0.0.1, ::1 or localhost (on Linux a Unix socket), to . on Windows (a named pipe), or to a comma-separated list of servers that holds such an element - which allows a local attacker who can stand in for the database server, for example by listening on its port while it is stopped or restarting, to receive the database sign-in, the password included, and to read and modify the traffic between hMailServer and its database. hMailServer applied verify-full by turning the client's certificate verification on without a CA file, but MariaDB Connector/C 3.4.1 and later, on a connection they treat as local and with no CA file, accept any certificate within its validity period that is self-signed or sent with its own root, for any name (Connector/C 3.4.2 to 3.4.10 also one whose issuer they cannot find), so the client accepted the certificate an impostor made, asked no proof of the password and allowed a switch to an authentication method that sends the password unhashed, while hmailserver --check-database said the certificate had been checked against the system's trust store and the application log that it had been checked. The Windows builds bundle Connector/C 3.4.9 (6.3.4 to 6.3.6) and 3.4.11 (6.3.7); on Linux the distribution's client is used, and Connector/C 3.3 and 3.4.0 and Oracle's MySQL client are not affected. The configuration is not the default: TlsMode defaults to prefer, which checks no certificate. |
| Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.2.25 through 6.3.7 on Windows, with a PostgreSQL database, the connection's sslmode require, verify-ca or verify-full, and a root certificate file named by PostgreSQLSslRootCert (from 6.2.25) or, with TlsMode=verify-full and neither PostgreSQL key set, by TlsCaFile (from 6.3.4), hands the file's name to libpq as bytes in the system's ANSI code page (up to 6.3.5 as Latin-1 bytes, which on code page 1252 are the code page's own for U+00A0 to U+00FF), and libpq looks for the file by those bytes and then hands the same bytes to OpenSSL, whose file opening on Windows reads a name as UTF-8 first and opens the file at that reading when one is there. When every byte of the name outside ASCII also reads as UTF-8 - for example U+00C3 U+00A9, the bytes C3 A9 on code page 1252, which are U+00E9 in UTF-8 - the database server's certificate was checked against the file at that other name whenever one was there, which allows a local attacker who can create that file but cannot change the configured one, as any user can by default beside a file an administrator keeps under ProgramData, or beside a folder directly under the system drive's root whose permissions the administrator restricted, and who can intercept the connection to the database server or stand in for it, to have hMailServer trust a certificate authority of the attacker's own and read and modify the traffic between hMailServer and its database, the database password included; the file alone, holding no authority that issued the database server's certificate, stops hMailServer from connecting to its database. The same applies in 6.3.4 through 6.3.7 to TlsCaFile when an Oracle MySQL client library has been put in place of the bundled MariaDB Connector/C, since that client opens the file through OpenSSL in the same way; the bundled MariaDB Connector/C opens the file in the code page and is not affected, and neither are the Linux builds. The configuration is not the default: by default no root certificate file is named. |
| Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0-B1 through 6.3.7 on Windows hands OpenSSL the names of its own TLS files - the listeners' certificates, chains, private keys and Diffie-Hellman parameters, a port's client-certificate CA file (from 6.2.19), the object store's CA file (from 6.3.4) and the ACME client's keys and certificates - as Latin-1 bytes, which on code page 1252 are the code page's own for U+00A0 to U+00FF, and OpenSSL's file opening on Windows reads a name as UTF-8 first and opens the file at that reading when it is there, or creates it there when its folder is. When every byte of a configured name outside ASCII also reads as UTF-8 - for example U+00C3 U+00A9, the bytes C3 A9, which are U+00E9 in UTF-8 - the server used the file at that other name whenever one was there, which allows a local attacker who can create that file or its folder but cannot change the configured one, as any user can by default beside a file an administrator keeps under ProgramData, to have a port that logs on by client certificate (from 6.2.25) accept certificates from a certificate authority of the attacker's own and so sign in over the network as any mailbox without its password; to have the server trust such an authority for its object store and, intercepting that connection, read and modify the messages it stores; to receive the private keys the ACME client writes, the key of a certificate issued for the server's names among them; or to keep TLS ports from starting. The configuration is not the default: by default these files have names in ASCII, client certificates are off on every port, and the object store and ACME are off. The Linux builds are not affected. |
| Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.3.4 through 6.3.7, with a MySQL or MariaDB database and TlsMode=verify-full, does not hand the database client the CA file that TlsCaFile names when the file's name contains a character outside ASCII on Linux, or above U+00FF on Windows, which allows an attacker who can intercept the connection to the database server to read and modify the traffic between hMailServer and its database, by presenting, with MariaDB Connector/C 3.4.2 to 3.4.10 as the client, a certificate from any authority, its own included, for any name, and otherwise a certificate for the database server's name issued by any certificate authority in the system's trust store. The server converted the name for the client with the C runtime's conversion in the C locale, which gives an empty string for such a name, and then set no CA file at all, without an error, while certificate verification stayed on, so the client - MariaDB Connector/C, bundled on Windows and the distribution's on Linux - verified the certificate of a database server over the network against the system's trust store instead of the configured CA; Connector/C 3.4.2 to 3.4.10 (bundled on Windows in 6.3.4 to 6.3.6) went further and, with no CA file, took a certificate within its dates whose issuer it could not find, for any name, with neither its chain nor its name checked and no password proof, when the server offered first a sign-in method that hashes the password, which an attacker in the middle chooses (MariaDB's CONC-853, fixed in Connector/C 3.4.11), and Connector/C 3.4 accepted from a MariaDB 11.4 or later server a certificate the store did not vouch for when that server proved it held the account's password; on a connection it treats as local (127.0.0.1, ::1, a Unix socket, a named pipe, and localhost on Windows), Connector/C 3.4.1 and later checked neither the certificate's issuer nor its name, so that a local attacker able to stand in for the database server could present any certificate within its dates of its own making. The settings line of hmailserver --check-database still named the configured file, and the application log said the certificate had been checked. With MariaDB Connector/C 3.4.1 to 3.4.9 as the client - bundled on Windows in 6.3.4 to 6.3.6, and the client of Linux distributions that have not patched it - the missing CA file also met the precondition of CVE-2026-107819, so that a certificate issued for any other name by a trusted authority was enough to obtain the database password. On Linux the file was found only when the server ran on glibc under a locale whose character set holds the name's characters (a UTF-8 locale, or a legacy 8-bit one the system has, in whose bytes the file is then named); with no locale, LC_ALL=C or a locale the system lacks, and on Alpine (musl), the connection failed instead. The configuration is not the default: TlsMode defaults to prefer, which checks no certificate. |
| A certificate validation bypass in Node.js https.Agent lets a cached TLS session authenticated under one CA policy be reused by a later request with a stricter policy. https.Agent.prototype.getName() assigns the same Agent and session-cache key to a request that omits ca and one that explicitly supplies ca: [], because an omitted value appends nothing to the key while an empty array stringifies to an empty string. The two policies differ: omitting ca uses the default trust store, while supplying ca replaces it. Since they share a key, a TLS session authenticated under the broader default policy is handed to a new connection made under the later ca: [] policy, and TLS 1.3 session resumption carries the earlier authentication forward, so the second request reports authorized === true and transmits confidential data to a server its own CA policy would reject on a fresh connection. This vulnerability affects Node.js 26.x, 24.x, and 22.x. |
| A client certificate authentication bypass in Node.js TLS lets a client change the servername during TLS 1.2 renegotiation to reach endpoints it was not authorized for. On a server that applies different client-certificate policies per hostname, for example stricter admin-only client-cert auth on one host and ordinary client-cert auth on another, a client that authenticates for a permitted host can renegotiate the TLS 1.2 connection under a different servername and carry its existing authentication to the protected host, bypassing the stricter policy. This vulnerability affects Node.js 26.x, 24.x, and 22.x. |
| A per-host mutual-TLS authorization bypass in Node.js lets a client authorized for the default hostname reach a protected hostname it is not authorized for. When a TLS server assigns a hostname a different client-certificate CA with `server.addContext(host, { ca: protectedCA })` but no server certificate in that SNI context, the per-host client CA is never installed and the handshake falls back to the default client CA. In `src/crypto/crypto_tls.cc`, `CertCbDone` installs the SNI context's CA only when `setSniContext` succeeds, but `setSniContext` returns `false` for a context with no server certificate, so a CA-only SNI context silently keeps the default CA. A client holding a certificate trusted by the default CA, but not the protected CA, can therefore complete mTLS to the protected hostname and read its response even with `requestCert` and `rejectUnauthorized` enabled, while a client certified by the protected CA is rejected. This vulnerability affects Node.js 26.x, 24.x, and 22.x. |
| An improper certificate validation vulnerability in the Support Form in Synology DiskStation Manager (DSM) before 7.3.2-86009-5 and 7.4.1-90080-1 allows man-in-the-middle attackers to read arbitrary files and write specific files during support form submission. |
| OkHttp through 5.5.1 contains an improper certificate validation vulnerability in CertificatePinner that skips pin checks because Pin.matchesHostname does not normalize trailing-dot hostnames. Network attackers with a CA-trusted certificate not matching configured pins can intercept or modify TLS traffic when applications request the trailing-dot form of pinned hosts. |
| Sleipnir Mobile for iPhone / iPad and Sleipnir Mobile for iPhone / iPad Black Edition provided by Fenrir Inc. are vulnerable to improper certificate verification. A man-in-the-middle attack may allow an attacker to eavesdrop on an encrypted communication. |
| libspdm is a sample implementation that follows the DMTF SPDM specifications. Prior to 3.8.3 and 4.0.0-rc2, libspdm_x509_verify_cert_chain() in os_stub/cryptlib_openssl/pk/x509.c and os_stub/cryptlib_mbedtls/pk/x509.c validates certificate signatures one link at a time instead of validating the complete X.509 path. In deployments using a pinned root with a constrained multi-tier PKI, an attacker holding a valid issuer credential below a constrained CA can present a subordinate certificate that exceeds pathLenConstraint or nameConstraints and may be accepted for SPDM identity validation. Exploitation requires the application to use libspdm's backend validation without an additional certificate-chain validation mechanism, the pinned root cannot be substituted, and the deployment's measurement policy must allow identity impersonation alone to satisfy its acceptance requirements. The mbedTLS backend remains unable to enforce nameConstraints because upstream mbedTLS does not implement that check. The full-chain validation changes are released in versions 3.8.3 and 4.0.0-rc2. |
| Dell OpenManage Ansible Modules, versions 9.2.0 through 10.0.3, contains an Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in the SessionAPI component. An unauthenticated attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to information exposure and unauthorized access. |
| Dell Ansible Storage for PowerFlex, versions prior to 3.2.0, contains an Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in the API client component. An unauthenticated attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to information exposure and unauthorized access. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, and 1.6.1, bws_cli_connect() in ports/linux/websocket-cli.c loads the trusted CA cert into the libwebsockets context, then always sets LCCSCF_ALLOW_SELFSIGNED in the connection flags. So lws accepts any self-signed hub certificate, whether or not it chains to the loaded CA. A BACnet/SC node finishes the TLS handshake to a rogue hub that presents a self-signed cert. It then hands the attacker its identity (VMAC, UUID) and all later BACnet traffic. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, 1.6.1, and 1.7.0. |
| IBM API Connect 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.12 and 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 could allow a network-positioned attacker to intercept backup data due to improper verification of the backup server's identity. The identity of the backup server is not verified when the secure connection for analytics backups is established, which could allow backup data, and credentials if used, to be intercepted. |