| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: cap the block count of xfs_iomap_write_direct() at one extent
xfs_iomap_write_direct() reserves blocks for the whole count in an
unsigned int. For a pNFS layout the client chooses that count, and an
RW LAYOUTGET for 16 TiB wraps the reservation and shuts XFS down.
xfs_bmapi_write() maps at most XFS_MAX_BMBT_EXTLEN blocks here, so cap
the count at that. nfsd asks again for the rest. The other callers get
the same mapping as before. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: mark the inode preallocated for pNFS write layouts past EOF
xfs_fs_map_blocks() marks the inode XFS_DIFLAG_PREALLOC only when it
allocates blocks for a write layout. A write layout past EOF can also
hand out allocated blocks, such as speculative preallocation. blockgc
then frees them under the layout, and another file may get them.
Mark the inode whenever a write mapping ends past EOF. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: kexec_file: Fix elf_headers memory leak in retry loop
A retry allocates new elf headers and overwrites image->elf_headers,
leaking the previous buffer.
Free it before assigning.
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: drop the redundant NULL check before vfree()] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/fair: Clear throttle state when leaving the fair class
Task-based CFS bandwidth throttling removes a task's fair sched_entity
while the scheduler core still considers the task queued. p->throttled
carries the fair-specific state across dequeue/enqueue operations.
DEQUEUE_CLASS removes the task from cfs_rq->throttled_limbo_list
but retains the bit. If the last finite CFS quota is disabled while
the task runs in another class, it is absent from the unthrottle walk and
the bit survives.
Returning to fair while cfs_bandwidth_used() is false then performs a real
fair enqueue with p->throttled still set.
After bandwidth is re-enabled, a class-change dequeue treats the
stale bit as limbo state and skips __dequeue_task(). p->se.on_rq therefore
remains set, and put_prev_task_fair() places the entity in the EEVDF tree
while the task moves to RT. On exit, the fair picker can select the
TASK_DEAD task. __schedule() then returns to do_task_dead(),
which hits BUG().
Keep p->throttled across migrations and group moves, but clear it on
DEQUEUE_CLASS because fair-specific state must not outlive fair-class
membership. A later return to fair uses the normal enqueue path. That path
still respects a throttled cfs_rq.
A KASAN, LOCKDEP and DEBUG_LIST v7.3 kernel reproduced the do_task_dead()
BUG in 3/3 root and 3/3 delegated uid-1000 runs with CapPrm=CapEff=0 and
RLIMIT_RTPRIO=1. The fix passed both matrices plus a 3/3 class-switch
control with bandwidth continuously enabled, without a scheduler warning,
KASAN report, lockdep splat or crash.
An AI coding assistant analyzed the state mismatch and drafted the initial
reproducer, fix candidate and this changelog. The source paths, trigger,
controls and results were rechecked against the cited revisions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: unlock the VM and BO when attaching a KFD BO fails
kfd_mem_attach() locks the page directory and the BO with a drm_exec
transaction on its stack, but leaves through the unwind label without
drm_exec_fini() when locking fails, e.g. when MAP_MEMORY_TO_GPU gets a
signal while the page directory or the BO is busy. Reservations already
acquired then remain locked with their ww_acquire_ctx pointing into the
expired stack frame.
With one thread doing GEM_VA map/unmap on the KFD VM and
another one mapping KFD BOs while getting SIGUSR1 every 20 us:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x34f5/0x3da0
ww_mutex_lock_interruptible+0x2f/0x150
drm_exec_lock_obj+0x107/0x2d0 [drm_exec]
kfd_mem_attach+0x4dd/0x1b60 [amdgpu]
and the process ends up in D state.
Finish the transaction before unwinding.
(cherry picked from commit 7b885fa27e4b9fa5cbdc64e66fc35872aee296f5) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Clamp the ATIF backlight curve to its 99 points
amdgpu_atif_query_backlight_caps() stores the firmware's number_of_points
as data_points but copies only the 99 points that luminance_data[] holds.
number_of_points is a u8, so a firmware table that claims more makes the
custom curve code in amdgpu_dm index past the array, and
dm_query_extended_brightness_caps() copy past the end of the
data_points[] buffer it fills
Clamp the count to ATIF_QBTC_MAX_DATA_POINTS and warn, since a table
that claims more is a firmware bug
(cherry picked from commit af8a1c2b7d3de4960e10f94e8ba2fc0ccd168072) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: use the queue's process info for the WPTR BO eviction fence
amdgpu_amdkfd_map_gtt_bo_to_gart() removes the eviction fence of
bo->vm_bo->vm->process_info from the WPTR BO of a new queue. bo->vm_bo
is the VM which opened the BO last, not necessarily the KFD process' VM,
and a render node VM has no process info.
On navi31, an unprivileged process which exports its WPTR BO with
AMDKFD_IOC_EXPORT_DMABUF and imports it on a second render node fd
oopses in AMDKFD_IOC_CREATE_QUEUE:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000060
RIP: 0010:amdgpu_amdkfd_map_gtt_bo_to_gart+0x86/0x1a0 [amdgpu]
init_user_queue.part.0+0x180/0x250 [amdgpu]
pqm_create_queue+0x32d/0x730 [amdgpu]
kfd_ioctl_create_queue+0x583/0x9f0 [amdgpu]
Pass the process info of the queue instead. With the fix, the queue is
created and destroyed normally.
(cherry picked from commit 6b4157498a176bd1c6083f6bb5aaf8a257a2027e) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mmu_notifier: set ->mm only after mmgrab()
Radeon uses a non-NULL notifier->mm to decide whether to call
mmu_interval_notifier_remove() when freeing a buffer object.
__mmu_interval_notifier_insert() sets ->mm before validating the range,
so a wrapping userptr range can leave ->mm set after insertion fails.
Cleanup then tries to remove an unregistered notifier for which no mm
reference was acquired.
Set ->mm only after mmgrab(), once insertion can no longer fail. While
we could fix radeon's code instead, setting ->mm on success only makes
the code more robust.
Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Chris Mason in private.
[ david: simplify description ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: don't spin in smc_rx_recvmsg() while a pipe holds spliced data
While bytes spliced off the RMB are still in a pipe, recvmsg() waits
for the pipe to release them before it copies the data behind them.
The path to that wait skips the timeout and signal checks, and
smc_rx_wait() returns at once on RCV_SHUTDOWN. With a signal pending,
after SHUT_RD, or once the peer closes or shuts down writing,
recvmsg() spins on a CPU until the pipe is drained, and SIGKILL cannot
stop it. MSG_DONTWAIT and an expired SO_RCVTIMEO wait there too
instead of returning -EAGAIN.
Check the timeout and signals before that wait, and end it when the
pipe releases the data or the connection is killed, not on RCV_SHUTDOWN.
A zero-length read returns 0 without waiting for the pipe; a
non-blocking one returns -EAGAIN while poll() still reports the socket
readable (splice() can still take those bytes). The wait sets
SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA like smc_rx_wait(), so a byte arriving behind
the pipe raises no SIGIO on a reader already asleep for it, and a full
barrier orders its wait queue entry before its read of splice_pending,
so no wake is lost. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usx2y: Guard the playback copy
usx2y_urb_play_prepare() sums the packet lengths of a whole URB, copies
that many frames with a single wrap, and sizes each playback packet from
the capture packet's actual_length. Three things are unchecked: that the
URB fits in the ring buffer, that a packet fits in the playback
endpoint's maxpacksize, from which tmpbuf is allocated, and that
actual_length is a whole number of frames. The ISO descriptors take the
raw actual_length while transfer_buffer_length and the copies take
count * stride, so a packet that is not a multiple of the stride makes
the descriptors add up to more than the buffer, by up to stride - 1
bytes per packet.
Return -EPIPE, as the existing packet-size check does, when the URB is
larger than the buffer or a packet is larger than maxpacksize, and size
each descriptor from whole frames, so the descriptors add up to
transfer_buffer_length and each stays within maxpacksize. The buffer
case is prevented by the previous patch and this is the guard for it;
the other two depend only on the device.
The first case is reachable on the unpatched driver with ordinary
packets: on 7.3-rc7, a USB/IP device presenting the US-122 interface
layout and sending 48-frame packets, with a 100-frame playback buffer
(two 50-frame periods, inside the stock constraints), KASAN reports:
BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in i_usx2y_urb_complete+0x79b/0x1ac0
Read of size 18446744073709551280 at addr ffff88800e6b02e0 by task vhci_rx/80
With both patches, the same device and a 200-frame playback buffer is
refused at hw_params with EINVAL, and a 400-frame buffer plays for 30 s
with the position advancing inside the buffer, no KASAN report and
neither guard message. The maxpacksize check is not exercised: the
emulated device reports the same wMaxPacketSize on both endpoints.
The descriptor case is visible with capture packets of 195 bytes at
stride 4 (48 frames and 3 bytes): without this change the four
descriptors add up to 780 bytes for 768 bytes of data, and USB/IP's
completion check refuses the URB ("total length of iso packets 780 not
equal to actual length of buffer 768", -EPROTO), after which the driver
stops the streams. With this patch every descriptor is 192 bytes, the
descriptors add up to the data in every URB for 30 s, the position
advances inside the buffer and KASAN reports nothing. The 48-frame
playback run above is unchanged. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
l2tp: only return sessions of the given tunnel in l2tp_session_get()
Commit 5f77c18ea556 ("l2tp: use IDR for all session lookups") made
pppol2tp_connect() and the netlink session commands find sessions with
l2tp_session_get(), passing the socket of the tunnel they name.
L2TPv3 session IDs are unique per network namespace, except that
sessions carried over UDP are only unique per UDP socket, the socket of
their tunnel. However, l2tp_v3_session_get() only checks the socket when
another session has the same session ID. Otherwise it returns the
session, whichever tunnel it belongs to. As of now, a session command
that names the wrong tunnel acts on a session of another tunnel, and a
PPPoL2TP socket for a second L2TPv3 tunnel fails with EEXIST, because it
finds session 0 of the first tunnel.
The issue can be reproduced with:
ip l2tp add tunnel tunnel_id 3 peer_tunnel_id 3 encap udp \
local 127.0.0.1 remote 127.0.0.1 udp_sport 5003 udp_dport 6003
ip l2tp add tunnel tunnel_id 4 peer_tunnel_id 4 encap udp \
local 127.0.0.1 remote 127.0.0.1 udp_sport 5004 udp_dport 6004
ip l2tp add session tunnel_id 3 session_id 7 peer_session_id 7
ip l2tp del session tunnel_id 4 session_id 7
ip l2tp show session
Before that commit, the delete fails with "No such device", and session
7 of tunnel 3 is still listed. After that commit, the delete succeeds,
and session 7 of tunnel 3 is gone.
This patch will make l2tp_session_get() return NULL when the L2TPv3
session it finds does not belong to the given socket. The receive path
calls l2tp_v3_session_get() directly and is not changed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/khugepaged: fix PMD table lock leak in try_collapse_pte_mapped_thp()
For a private mapping with userfaultfd, try_collapse_pte_mapped_thp()
takes the PMD table lock before it maps the page table for the second time.
If that (pte_offset_map_rw_nolock) fails, because the page table vanished
in the meantime due to concurrent page table reclaim, it leaves through
the abort label, where the PMD table lock is unlocked if it differs from
PTE table lock.
In case the PMD table lock and the PTE table lock match, which is the
case without CONFIG_SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS after pte_offset_map_rw_nolock()
failed, we miss to unlock the PMD table.
To fix it, forget the PTE table lock when we unmap+unlock the PTE table.
Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Josef Bacik in private.
[ david: move the ptl = NULL handling; rewrite description, drop wrong comments ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: raw, isotp: copy socket options outside of lock_sock()
The CAN_RAW and CAN_ISOTP specific socket options are copied from and
to user space while holding lock_sock(). A copy that faults or stalls,
e.g. on a userfaultfd or FUSE backed mapping, holds lock_sock() for its
whole duration.
raw_notify() and isotp_notify() take lock_sock() of a socket that is
bound to the vanishing device while holding RTNL. As the CAN_RAW
options can also be changed on a bound socket, a stalled copy can block
RTNL on an unregistration or namespace change of the bound device.
Before "can: protect the receive lists with a per-device lock",
raw_setsockopt() even held RTNL itself during the copy. CAN_ISOTP only
copies its options for unbound sockets, which isotp_notify() skips
without taking lock_sock().
Keep the user space copies out of the locked sections: Check the option
name and length and copy the option values, including the CAN_RAW_FILTER
filters, to kernel memory before lock_sock(). raw_setsockopt_locked()
and isotp_setsockopt_locked() get the copied values directly and drop
their now redundant length checks and copies. As a side effect, a
failing copy can not leave partially overwritten options behind
anymore. In raw_getsockopt() duplicate the filters under lock_sock() and
copy them to user space after release_sock().
As the option name and length are now checked before lock_sock(), the
order of the checks in isotp_setsockopt() and accordingly the order of
the returned error values changes. This is in line with POSIX, which
does not define an order in which multiple error conditions are
detected and reported.
The generic SOL_SOCKET options in sk_setsockopt() are not affected by
this patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
assoc_array: keep gc's cleanup out of the live tree on allocation failure
assoc_array_gc() builds a copy of the tree. Where the copy reaches a
shortcut, it allocates the copy of the shortcut with kmalloc_flex(),
fills it with memcpy(), links it into the new tree, and only then
allocates the copy of the node after it. The memcpy() leaves the new
shortcut's next_node pointing at the old tree's node, so if that second
allocation fails, the cleanup, assoc_array_destroy_subtree() on the new
tree, follows the new shortcut into the old tree, and the BUG_ON() on
the old node's back pointer fires.
Allocate the node first, and the shortcut once the node exists, freeing
the node again if the shortcut cannot be allocated. A copied shortcut
is then only linked into the new tree when the copy of its node is there
to follow it. Nothing else changes: with no allocation failing, the
trees gc builds are the same as before.
Found by a userspace test that makes each allocation of each operation
fail in turn. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
assoc_array: don't chain a new shortcut onto an existing one
When a full node's leaves and the new key all share the node's segment,
assoc_array_insert_into_terminal_node() replaces the node with a
shortcut to a pair of new nodes. If the node is itself the target of a
shortcut, the new shortcut is installed as that shortcut's next node,
and a shortcut leading to a shortcut is something nothing expects:
assoc_array_walk() indexes the second one as a node, and
assoc_array_apply_edit() hits the BUG_ON() in the loop that adjusts
nr_leaves_on_branch, on that same insertion.
Deletion gets a node there. When the subtree below a shortcut shrinks
enough, assoc_array_delete() collapses it into one node below the
shortcut, and the leaves it collects can all share that node's segment.
The next key that shares it too takes this path. Eighteen insertions
and a deletion are enough: sixteen keys that agree on bits 0-11, one
that leaves them at bit 8 and is deleted again, and one more that agrees
with the sixteen.
Have the new shortcut replace the one in front of the node as well.
assoc_array_insert_shortcut() gives it that shortcut's back pointer and
parent slot, so the caller installs it where that one was, and excises
the old shortcut along with the node, which takes a second entry in
excised_meta[]. The new shortcut's index key comes from the new key up
to the new skip level, so it covers what the old one did.
Found by a userspace test doing random insertions and deletions on keys
that share long prefixes; a targeted case builds a shortcut, deletes
down to the collapse and inserts one more key. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd/iova_bitmap: Ensure that iova_bitmap_set() handles the full IOVA
Generally userspace is going to step the dirty bitmap through the IOVA
space. However if the bitmap ends in the middle of a large PTE this is
problematic. The first step will clear the dirty bit and report dirty to
the end of its bitmap while the second step will see the clear'd dirty and
report clean for the start of the bitmap. If it happens this ends up
losing dirties.
Further this function is missing bounds checking so if this does happen
ther is a good chance it will write memory beyond what the userspace was
expecting.
Return an error code if this illegal condition happens. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: release a removed xattr node in roll-forward recovery
When xattrs shrink enough to fit in the inline xattr area,
write_all_xattrs() truncates the xattr node and clears i_xattr_nid. If
the file is then fsynced without a checkpoint, only the inode block is
written, with i_xattr_nid of 0.
Roll-forward recovery starts from the checkpointed inode, whose
i_xattr_nid still points to the old xattr node.
f2fs_recover_inline_xattr() copies only the inline xattr area, and
f2fs_update_inode() writes the old i_xattr_nid back. So the inode keeps
the stale xattr node:
- The node block is never released, and fsck reports "nonzero bytes in
xattr space after end of list".
- If the inline xattr list ends exactly at the end of the inline area,
its terminator is read from the stale node, and the removed xattrs
come back after recovery.
When the fsynced inode has no xattr node but the checkpointed one has,
release the old xattr node as truncate_node() does: check its block
address, invalidate the block and drop its node cache, which may still
be dirty. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to avoid potential reference count leak in do_garbage_collect()
In do_garbage_collect(), we have reserved reference counts on summary cache
of all segments, once gc_thread encounter freezing, we need to release all
reference counts. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: vgic: Stop the target vcpu when disabling LPIs
Disabling LPIs is pretty nasty, as it directly messes with the AP list
of the affected CPU, which could be running... This has the potential to
lead to really bad behaviours, and we should not be doing that.
Take example on the way the Active state is handled and simply pause the
the vcpu so that we are sure it is in a quiescent state, and the state be
safely manipulated.
Nobody has any expectation of performance for this anyway. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: bound the SIT/NAT bitmaps by the checkpoint pack
sit_ver_bitmap_bytesize and nat_ver_bitmap_bytesize are used as memcpy
lengths into and out of sbi->ckpt, which is sized from cp_payload alone,
and nothing compares either length against that allocation.
sanity_check_ckpt() has checked these two fields since c77ec61ca0a4, which
added them after a crafted image overran build_sit_info(). That check ties
each length to a segment count; it never compares either against the
allocation, which is the half this adds.
Mounting over-reads in build_sit_info() and build_node_manager(), and the
first checkpoint writes the same lengths back through the same pointers,
so the over-read's contents reach the on-disk checkpoint. An unmount is
enough; the filesystem does not have to be used.
Bound both ends the way __bitmap_ptr() lays them out. The three branches
differ, so a single sum of the two lengths would still admit a small
overflow when cp_payload is non-zero. |