| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A vulnerability in the debug logging functionality of ClamAV could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a DoS condition on an affected device.
This vulnerability is due to improper handling of logging values. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by submitting a file to be scanned by the software that has debug logging enabled. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the ClamAV scanning process to terminate, resulting in a DoS condition on the affected software. |
| A vulnerability in the Ultimate Packer for eXecutables (UPX) unpacker of ClamAV could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a DoS condition on an affected device.
This vulnerability is due to improper length checks, when unpacking the UPX files, which may result in an out-of-bounds read of heap memory. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by submitting a crafted UPX for decode. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the ClamAV decode process to terminate, resulting in a DoS condition on the affected software. |
| A vulnerability in the Object Linking and Embedding, 2nd Generation (OLE2) file parser for ClamAV could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to exceed the configured MaxScanTime and cause a DoS condition on an affected device.
This vulnerability is due to inefficiencies when parsing specifically formatted files with the OLE2 file parser. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by by sending a crafted Microsoft Compound File Binary (CFB) file to be scanned. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to effectively cause the ClamAV OLE2 parser to get into an infinite loop, resulting in a DoS condition on the affected software. |
| A vulnerability in the eXtensible ARchive (XAR) GZIP file parser for ClamAV could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to exceed the configured MaxFileSize and cause a DoS condition on an affected device.
This vulnerability is due to inefficiencies when parsing specifically formatted files with the XAR GZIP file parser. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by by sending a crafted XAR GZIP file to be scanned. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to effectively cause the ClamAV to exceed the MaxFileSize and potentially get caught in an infinite loop, causing a DoS condition. |
| Dell PowerStore SDNAS contains an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the storage-processor interconnect driver that could allow a malicious peer to execute code with system privileges. |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4 remote code execution was possible via Kubernetes Executor settings |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4, 2025.11.8 improper authorization allowed publishing packages to NuGet feeds of other projects |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4, 2025.11.8 missing authorization allowed project viewers to remove VCS roots |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4, 2025.11.8 remote code execution was possible via native code loading in the Kotlin DSL sandbox |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4, 2025.11.8 unauthenticated DoS via the agent protocol was possible |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4 an SSRF via connection tests was possible for users without project edit permissions |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2 two-factor authentication bypass was possible via access token management |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4 stored XSS in the unified diff page syntax highlighting was possible |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4 improper authorization allowed users with the Run build permission to delete Perforce workspaces |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fix buffer overruns in xfs_ioc_attr_list
When we converted the al_offset array in struct xfs_attrlist into a VLA,
the size of the object shrank by 4 bytes. Unfortunately, the buffer
size validation in the attrlist ioctl wasn't updated to notice this, so
the al_offset[0] assignment blindly writes off the end of the buffer.
LOLLM noticed the omitted check and complained. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: skip copy up of empty security.capability
ovl_copy_xattr() gives up if it can't read an attribute that
listxattr() has named. An empty security.capability, which anybody has
been able to store on any file for a long time, is such a case: it is
listed, and getxattr() has nothing to return for it. A file in a lower
layer that carries one can't be copied up: it can't be written to,
renamed or have its mode changed.
There is nothing to copy if there are no data. Go on with the next
one.
[amir: treat -EINVAL as no capability too, and do the same in
ovl_copy_up_meta_inode_data()] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: set the revalidate flags after d_instantiate()
stat() of a file on an overlayfs mount triggers a kernel warning and
fails with ECHILD if another task is creating that file at the same
time. This happens on an overlay with a FUSE upper layer, which is the
layer where overlayfs creates new files. Write access to a directory on
such an overlay is all a user needs to run the two tasks.
The revalidate flags are DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE and
DCACHE_OP_WEAK_REVALIDATE. They tell path walk to call ->d_revalidate()
or ->d_weak_revalidate() on a dentry, so that the filesystem can check
that the cached dentry is still valid. An overlay dentry only has one of
these flags if a dentry in one of its layers has it. FUSE dentries have
the first one.
When a flag is set on an overlay dentry, path walk calls
ovl_dentry_revalidate_common(). That function only expects a dentry
without an inode in RCU walk, while the dentry is being destroyed. For
such a dentry outside of RCU walk, it hits a WARN_ON() and
returns -ECHILD. So a negative overlay dentry must never have the flags
set.
ovl_instantiate() breaks this rule. When a task creates a file, the
overlay dentry for the new name is hashed but still negative.
ovl_instantiate() then works in this order:
- It copies the flags from the new upper dentry to the overlay dentry.
- It calls ovl_get_inode(), which can sleep in a getxattr request to the
FUSE server.
- Only then does it call d_instantiate().
A second task that looks up the name between the first step and the last
finds a negative dentry with the flags set and revalidates it.
Reproduced with a FUSE server that delays its getxattr reply: stat() of
a name that was being created hit the WARN_ON() and failed with ECHILD.
Fix this by setting the flags after d_instantiate(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: read the nlink xattr of every indexed non-dir
With nfs_export=on, data written through a file handle to a lower file,
i.e. a file that exists only in a lower layer of the overlay, can be
lost on the next mount. A lookup of the file by name then returns -EIO.
Also, a file with one name reports st_nlink 2 once it has been copied to
the upper layer. After such a file is removed, its file handle can still
open it until the next mount.
Before a lower file is changed for the first time, overlayfs copies it
to the writable upper layer. This is called copy up.
The index directory is $workdir/index, where $workdir is the directory
given by the workdir= option. Each entry is named after the file handle
of a lower inode, so that overlayfs can get from the handle to the
copied up inode.
With nfs_export=on, copy up indexes every non-directory: it copies the
file to an entry in the index directory and then hard links that entry
into the upper directory. The index entry is an extra link to the upper
inode, so overlayfs stores the link count that users should see in the
overlay.nlink xattr.
A file can also be opened by handle, either by an NFS client or by a
process with CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH calling open_by_handle_at(). If the
file is not in the dcache, its overlay dentry is disconnected, i.e. it
has no parent yet. Copy up then creates the index entry but no hard link
in the upper directory. The index entry has i_nlink 1 and holds the only
copy of the data written to the file.
ovl_get_nlink() reads the stored count. Its caller passes a default,
which the function returns if there is no stored count. If the lower
inode has i_nlink 1, the function returns the default without reading
the xattr. That was correct as long as only lower files with multiple
links were indexed.
On the next mount, ovl_verify_index() looks for orphans, i.e. index
entries of files whose last name was removed. For an index entry with
i_nlink 1, it passes a default of 0 to ovl_get_nlink() and treats a
result of 0 as an orphan. Here the lower inode also has i_nlink 1, so
the result is the default. ovl_indexdir_cleanup() then replaces the
entry with a whiteout, which in the index marks a file as deleted. The
written data is lost.
A lookup by name then returns -EIO, because a whiteout as the index
entry of a lower file that still exists is a bad index.
ovl_get_inode() gets the wrong count the same way. Its default is the
i_nlink of the upper inode, which includes the index entry, so a copied
up file with one name reports st_nlink 2.
When that name is removed, the count drops to 1 rather than 0.
ovl_nlink_end() replaces the index entry with a whiteout only at a count
of 0, so the entry stays, and the handle of the removed file still opens
it.
Reproduced by writing through open_by_handle_at() to an uncached lower
file with one link. After a remount the data was lost, and the name
returned EIO.
Fix this by adding an argument to ovl_get_nlink() that says whether the
caller found an index entry, and by skipping the xattr only if the
caller found none.
Known gaps:
- An index entry that a kernel without this patch left behind for a
removed file now stays, and the handle of that file keeps working. The
entry has i_nlink 1 and a stored count of 1, just like the entry of a
file that was only written by handle. Without this patch, the next
mount treated it as an orphan. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: fix a torn path in ovl_get_redirect()
A hard link of a metacopy file that races with a rename of an ancestor
stores a redirect to the wrong lower file.
Each component of an absolute redirect must be the name that a dentry
has in the parent that the walk continues with. ovl_get_redirect()
copies the name under d_lock and calls dget_parent() after the unlock,
and the callers for a hard link hold no lock that stops a rename across
directories. A rename between the two steps combines the old name with
the new parent.
With delays in ovl_get_redirect(), an unprivileged user hard-linked a
metacopy file while renaming its ancestor to another directory, the
stored redirect named another lower path, and after a remount the file
showed the data of a root-only file.
Fix this by taking the parent first and checking it again under d_lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: do not copy up an xattr value that was never read
Copy-up stores uninitialized kernel memory in an xattr of the upper
file, where the user can read it.
ovl_copy_xattr() may only pass bytes to ovl_do_setxattr() that
ovl_do_getxattr() has read. When the read fails with -ERANGE the
function asks for the size again, and if the new size fits the buffer
it stores the buffer although nothing was read into it. The buffer
comes from kvmalloc(), or it still holds the value of the previous
xattr.
A FUSE lower layer that answers every sized GETXATTR with -ERANGE made
copy-up store 4096 bytes that the server never sent, with a kernel
pointer in them, as an xattr of the upper file.
Fix this by failing the copy-up with -EIO when the size that follows
-ERANGE fits the buffer. |