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Search Results (91 CVEs found)

CVE Vendors Products Updated CVSS v3.1
CVE-2026-101028 1 Ash-project 1 Ash 2026-10-09 6.5 Medium
Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an actor to infer data in related records they cannot read via Ash.count/2, Ash.exists/2 and Ash.aggregate/3. Ash.Actions.Aggregate.run/4 (lib/ash/actions/aggregate.ex) applied only the root resource's read policy before running the aggregate query. The read path also applies each related resource's read policy to filter and sort references that cross a relationship, directly (for example comments.body) or through an aggregate over one, but the aggregate path skipped that step. A caller whose filter or sort reaches these functions, for example through Ash.Query.filter_input/2, an ash_lua script, or an AshAi tool offering count or exists results, can test conditions against related rows hidden from them and recover their existence and attribute values one query at a time. Ash.read/2 and its page counts are not affected. This issue affects ash: from 2.6.0 before 3.34.6.
CVE-2026-94201 1 Ash-project 1 Ash 2026-10-06 N/A
Ash stores :atom-typed attributes as strings and compares them as strings. When such an attribute is referenced in a filter, the comparison value is coerced through Ash.Type.Atom. Because the type defined no coerce/2 callback, coercion fell back to the default (cast_input/2), which calls String.to_atom/1 when the attribute is configured with the unsafe_to_atom?: true constraint. Filtering such an attribute with attacker-controlled strings therefore interned a new, permanent atom for every distinct value. Atoms are never garbage collected and the BEAM caps the atom table, so an actor who can supply filter values for a public, filterable :atom attribute declared with unsafe_to_atom?: true can exhaust the atom table and crash the node (denial of service). AshPaperTrail is a notable example: its version resources expose a public, filterable version_action_name atom attribute with unsafe_to_atom?: true by default. The fix adds a coerce/2 to Ash.Type.Atom that never interns atoms — a comparison value is left as a string, since the type is stored and compared as a string. Setting the attribute from action input (cast_input/2, which still honors unsafe_to_atom?) is unchanged. This issue affects ash: from 3.5.1 before 3.34.3.
CVE-2026-93477 1 Ash-project 1 Ash 2026-09-25 N/A
Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in ash-project ash allows a user to set the value of a private action argument on the bulk destroy and bulk update paths. Action arguments declared with public?: false are meant to be set only by trusted server-side code (for example via Ash.Changeset.set_private_argument/3) and must not be settable from end-user input. CVE-2026-55736 fixed the non-bulk changeset path to strip private arguments from user-supplied parameter maps, but the bulk destroy and bulk update paths were not covered. Ash.Actions.Destroy.Bulk.base_changeset/5 and Ash.Actions.Update.Bulk.base_changeset/5 match every key in the caller-supplied parameter map against all of the action's arguments with no public? check, then apply the matches to the base changeset. A caller who can submit parameters to a bulk destroy or bulk update action (for example through AshJsonApi, AshGraphql, or a controller that forwards request parameters to Ash.bulk_destroy/4 or Ash.bulk_update/4) can therefore set any private argument of that action, including one referenced by an arg(...) template in the action's changes or validations. Depending on how the application uses the argument (for example an acting_user_id driving authorization or record ownership, or audit metadata), this can lead to an integrity violation or privilege escalation. The fix requires public? in the argument matching on both bulk paths; private arguments remain settable server-side via the :private_arguments option. This issue affects ash: from 2.17.15 before 3.33.11.
CVE-2025-48043 1 Ash-project 1 Ash 2026-09-22 N/A
Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash allows Authentication Bypass. This issue affects ash: from 0.1.1 before 3.6.2.
CVE-2025-48044 1 Ash-project 1 Ash 2026-09-22 N/A
Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash allows Authentication Bypass. This issue affects ash: from 3.6.3 before 3.7.1.
CVE-2025-48042 1 Ash-project 1 Ash 2026-09-22 N/A
Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels. This issue affects ash: from 0.1.1 before 3.5.39.
CVE-2026-86338 1 Ash-project 1 Ash 2026-09-16 N/A
Ash field_policies are documented to protect against filter-based information disclosure: when a field the actor may not see is referenced in a filter, it is replaced with an expression that evaluates to nil, so a filter cannot be used as a yes/no oracle to read a value the actor cannot see. This nilling was applied to attributes but not to calculations or aggregates. A user-supplied filter reference to a calculation or aggregate carries an Ash.Query.Calculation / Ash.Query.Aggregate struct, which the authorizer's reference replacement did not match (it only matched the Ash.Resource.* structs), so the filter ran against the real value. As a result, an actor whose field policies forbid a calculation or aggregate can still filter by it (for example filter(secret_calc == "x") or filter(comment_count == n)) and learn the value from whether rows match — an oracle that recovers field-policy-protected values one probe at a time. Filtering is commonly exposed to lower-privileged actors (for example via AshGraphql or AshJsonApi filter arguments), which is exactly the surface field policies are meant to protect. The fix routes filter references to calculations and aggregates through the same field-policy nilling as attributes. This issue affects ash: from 2.11.0-rc.0 before 3.33.4.
CVE-2026-78216 1 Ash-project 1 Ash Lua 2026-09-08 N/A
AshLua exposes Ash read actions to Lua scripts run through an eval action. A read call accepts an operation (list, min, max, first, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value. Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A script could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate instead of as a field. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The prior hardening only enforced the exposed-field allow-list (field visibility), which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization. The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible. This issue affects ash_lua: from 0.1.0 before 0.2.2.
CVE-2026-78230 1 Ash-project 1 Ash Ai 2026-09-08 N/A
AshAi exposes Ash read actions to language-model tool calls. The read tool accepts an aggregate result type (min, max, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value. Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A tool caller could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate; min/max in particular return an actual field value. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The tool's existing check only required the field to be public, which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization. The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible. This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.3.
CVE-2026-55736 1 Ash-project 1 Ash 2026-07-09 N/A
Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in ash-project ash allows a user to set the value of a private action argument that is intended to be controlled only by trusted server-side code. Action arguments declared with public?: false are meant to be set internally (for example via Ash.Changeset.set_private_argument/3) and must not be settable from end-user input. When a changeset is built from a parameter map, Ash filters out private arguments, but the filtering is incomplete. In the regular changeset path (for_create, for_update, for_destroy), private arguments are stripped only when the parameter key is an atom. When the key is a binary (string), as is the case for user-supplied parameters, the private argument is kept and the user controls its value. In the atomic path (Ash.Changeset.fully_atomic_changeset/4, also reached through atomic and bulk updates), private arguments are not stripped at all, regardless of whether the key is an atom or a binary. An attacker who can submit parameters to an action that defines a private argument can therefore inject a value for that argument. Depending on how the application uses the argument (for example an acting_user_id driving authorization or record ownership), this can lead to an integrity violation or privilege escalation. This issue affects ash: from 3.0.0 before 3.29.3.
CVE-2026-34593 2 Ash-hq, Ash-project 2 Ash Framework, Ash 2026-04-14 7.5 High
Ash Framework is a declarative, extensible framework for building Elixir applications. Prior to version 3.22.0, Ash.Type.Module.cast_input/2 unconditionally creates a new Erlang atom via Module.concat([value]) for any user-supplied binary string that starts with "Elixir.", before verifying whether the referenced module exists. Because Erlang atoms are never garbage-collected and the BEAM atom table has a hard default limit of approximately 1,048,576 entries, an attacker who can submit values to any resource attribute or argument of type :module can exhaust this table and crash the entire BEAM VM, taking down the application. This issue has been patched in version 3.22.0.