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Search Results (6 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-132559 | 1 Temporal | 1 Temporal-proxy | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| When payload encryption is enabled, failure messages and stack traces that temporal-proxy is configured to keep from the upstream Temporal service can reach it in plaintext, where anyone who can read the Workflow's history at the upstream can read them. When the proxy returns a failure to a Worker, it decrypts the failure's encoded attributes and copies the message and stack trace back onto the failure, keeping the attributes. A Worker that sends that failure back through the proxy, as SDKs do when an Activity failure becomes the cause of a Workflow failure, sends the restored text with it, and the proxy forwards the text unchanged because the failure already has encoded attributes. The upstream then stores the text in plaintext beside its encrypted copy. This affects deployments that enable failure encryption in the proxy, and deployments that leave it off while the SDK encodes failure attributes itself. Payloads are not affected. temporal-proxy versions 0.9.0 through 1.2.0 are affected. The issue is fixed in 1.0.2, 1.1.2, and 1.2.1, and releases before 1.0.0 receive no fix. Upgrade to the fixed release for the deployed minor release line. | ||||
| CVE-2026-130092 | 1 Temporal | 1 Temporal-proxy | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| A caller who can reach the temporal-proxy gRPC listener, with or without a valid credential, can grow the proxy's memory until the process is terminated by sending requests with many distinct gRPC method names. temporal-proxy labels its request metrics with the method name exactly as the caller sent it, and records every request, including those that authentication or routing reject. Each distinct method name adds metric series that are never removed. The series grow whether or not the metrics endpoint is scraped, and metric labels configured from request metadata multiply the growth. temporal-proxy versions 0.1.0-alpha.20260716 through 1.2.0 are affected. The issue is fixed in 1.0.2, 1.1.2, and 1.2.1, and releases before 1.0.0 receive no fix. Upgrade to the fixed release for the deployed minor release line. | ||||
| CVE-2026-130089 | 1 Temporal | 1 Temporal-proxy | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| A caller who can send requests to the temporal-proxy gRPC listener can obtain the static API key of an upstream whose address is templated from the request namespace, and then use that key directly against the upstream Temporal service. temporal-proxy does not validate the request namespace before rendering it into a templated upstream address, so when an upstream's hostPort is templated from the namespace, as in the published Temporal Cloud configuration example, a crafted namespace changes the host the proxy dials. If that upstream verifies TLS against the system trust store and sets no literal server name, a caller-controlled host with a publicly trusted certificate passes verification and receives the key. The built-in static-token and JWKS authenticators do not restrict namespaces, so any caller they admit can do this; an external authenticator that admits only listed namespaces prevents it. temporal-proxy versions 0.1.0 through 1.2.0 are affected. The issue is fixed in 1.0.2, 1.1.2, and 1.2.1, and releases before 1.0.0 receive no fix. Upgrade to the fixed release for the deployed minor release line, and rotate any upstream API key that untrusted callers could reach. | ||||
| CVE-2026-130091 | 1 Temporal | 1 Temporal-proxy | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| A caller with write permission in a namespace can terminate temporal-proxy through memory exhaustion by storing highly compressed payloads in Workflow history, and the stored history causes the same failure on every later read. temporal-proxy 1.2.0 decompresses every payload marked as compressed in the responses it forwards, whether or not compression is configured. Each payload is limited to 4 MiB after decompression, but the total for a response is not, and the decoded payloads are held in memory together. The caller can store many small, highly compressed payloads through the proxy or directly at the upstream Temporal service. When that history is read through the proxy, for example by a Worker processing a task, the proxy can run out of memory and be terminated. The codec server's /decode endpoint is affected in the same way when it is enabled. Only temporal-proxy 1.2.0 is affected; earlier versions do not decompress payloads. The issue is fixed in 1.2.1. Upgrade to 1.2.1 or later. | ||||
| CVE-2026-130090 | 1 Temporal | 1 Temporal-proxy | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| When two templated upstreams in temporal-proxy render the same address, a request routed to one upstream can be sent under the other upstream's credential, namespace translation, and payload encryption keys. temporal-proxy pools connections for templated upstreams by rendered address and TLS server name only, although each upstream's outbound credential, namespace translation, and payload encryption keys, where configured, are attached to its connection. A request routed to one upstream can therefore be sent over the connection the other created, and the upstream Temporal service authorizes it as the other upstream's principal. Configuration validation rejects only identical hostPort values, so templates that differ in text but render the same address are accepted. This mixes the two upstreams' ordinary traffic, and a caller that an external authenticator restricts to one upstream's namespaces can use it to act under the other upstream's credential. Deployments with at most one templated upstream are not affected. temporal-proxy versions 0.1.0 through 1.1.1 are affected. The issue is fixed in 1.0.2, 1.1.2, and 1.2.0, and releases before 1.0.0 receive no fix. Upgrade to the fixed release for the deployed minor release line. | ||||
| CVE-2026-108126 | 1 Temporal | 1 Temporal-proxy | 2026-10-26 | N/A |
| temporal-proxy 0.2.0 through 0.8.0 does not bind encrypted payloads to the namespace they were encrypted for. When payload encryption is enabled, the proxy chooses the decryption key by an identifier stored in the payload rather than by the namespace of the request, and nothing in the ciphertext records that namespace. A caller whom the proxy authorizes only for namespace B, and who has obtained an encrypted payload from namespace A, can therefore have the proxy decrypt it. In 0.8.0, the caller can submit the payload to the codec server's /decode endpoint. In every affected version, a caller who can also write to namespace B on the Temporal server directly can place the payload there and read it back through the proxy. This holds whether namespaces share the default key or each has its own, because a single proxy holds every key it is configured with. The issue does not give the attacker encrypted payloads they could not already obtain, and does not allow encrypted payloads to be modified. | ||||
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