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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-99678 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 6.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: cap the block count of xfs_iomap_write_direct() at one extent xfs_iomap_write_direct() reserves blocks for the whole count in an unsigned int. For a pNFS layout the client chooses that count, and an RW LAYOUTGET for 16 TiB wraps the reservation and shuts XFS down. xfs_bmapi_write() maps at most XFS_MAX_BMBT_EXTLEN blocks here, so cap the count at that. nfsd asks again for the rest. The other callers get the same mapping as before. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99680 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.9 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: mark the inode preallocated for pNFS write layouts past EOF xfs_fs_map_blocks() marks the inode XFS_DIFLAG_PREALLOC only when it allocates blocks for a write layout. A write layout past EOF can also hand out allocated blocks, such as speculative preallocation. blockgc then frees them under the layout, and another file may get them. Mark the inode whenever a write mapping ends past EOF. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99594 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 2.3 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: kexec_file: Fix elf_headers memory leak in retry loop A retry allocates new elf headers and overwrites image->elf_headers, leaking the previous buffer. Free it before assigning. [catalin.marinas@arm.com: drop the redundant NULL check before vfree()] | ||||
| CVE-2026-99595 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/fair: Clear throttle state when leaving the fair class Task-based CFS bandwidth throttling removes a task's fair sched_entity while the scheduler core still considers the task queued. p->throttled carries the fair-specific state across dequeue/enqueue operations. DEQUEUE_CLASS removes the task from cfs_rq->throttled_limbo_list but retains the bit. If the last finite CFS quota is disabled while the task runs in another class, it is absent from the unthrottle walk and the bit survives. Returning to fair while cfs_bandwidth_used() is false then performs a real fair enqueue with p->throttled still set. After bandwidth is re-enabled, a class-change dequeue treats the stale bit as limbo state and skips __dequeue_task(). p->se.on_rq therefore remains set, and put_prev_task_fair() places the entity in the EEVDF tree while the task moves to RT. On exit, the fair picker can select the TASK_DEAD task. __schedule() then returns to do_task_dead(), which hits BUG(). Keep p->throttled across migrations and group moves, but clear it on DEQUEUE_CLASS because fair-specific state must not outlive fair-class membership. A later return to fair uses the normal enqueue path. That path still respects a throttled cfs_rq. A KASAN, LOCKDEP and DEBUG_LIST v7.3 kernel reproduced the do_task_dead() BUG in 3/3 root and 3/3 delegated uid-1000 runs with CapPrm=CapEff=0 and RLIMIT_RTPRIO=1. The fix passed both matrices plus a 3/3 class-switch control with bandwidth continuously enabled, without a scheduler warning, KASAN report, lockdep splat or crash. An AI coding assistant analyzed the state mismatch and drafted the initial reproducer, fix candidate and this changelog. The source paths, trigger, controls and results were rechecked against the cited revisions. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99621 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: unlock the VM and BO when attaching a KFD BO fails kfd_mem_attach() locks the page directory and the BO with a drm_exec transaction on its stack, but leaves through the unwind label without drm_exec_fini() when locking fails, e.g. when MAP_MEMORY_TO_GPU gets a signal while the page directory or the BO is busy. Reservations already acquired then remain locked with their ww_acquire_ctx pointing into the expired stack frame. With one thread doing GEM_VA map/unmap on the KFD VM and another one mapping KFD BOs while getting SIGUSR1 every 20 us: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x34f5/0x3da0 ww_mutex_lock_interruptible+0x2f/0x150 drm_exec_lock_obj+0x107/0x2d0 [drm_exec] kfd_mem_attach+0x4dd/0x1b60 [amdgpu] and the process ends up in D state. Finish the transaction before unwinding. (cherry picked from commit 7b885fa27e4b9fa5cbdc64e66fc35872aee296f5) | ||||
| CVE-2026-99623 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 4.4 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Clamp the ATIF backlight curve to its 99 points amdgpu_atif_query_backlight_caps() stores the firmware's number_of_points as data_points but copies only the 99 points that luminance_data[] holds. number_of_points is a u8, so a firmware table that claims more makes the custom curve code in amdgpu_dm index past the array, and dm_query_extended_brightness_caps() copy past the end of the data_points[] buffer it fills Clamp the count to ATIF_QBTC_MAX_DATA_POINTS and warn, since a table that claims more is a firmware bug (cherry picked from commit af8a1c2b7d3de4960e10f94e8ba2fc0ccd168072) | ||||
| CVE-2026-99632 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: use the queue's process info for the WPTR BO eviction fence amdgpu_amdkfd_map_gtt_bo_to_gart() removes the eviction fence of bo->vm_bo->vm->process_info from the WPTR BO of a new queue. bo->vm_bo is the VM which opened the BO last, not necessarily the KFD process' VM, and a render node VM has no process info. On navi31, an unprivileged process which exports its WPTR BO with AMDKFD_IOC_EXPORT_DMABUF and imports it on a second render node fd oopses in AMDKFD_IOC_CREATE_QUEUE: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000060 RIP: 0010:amdgpu_amdkfd_map_gtt_bo_to_gart+0x86/0x1a0 [amdgpu] init_user_queue.part.0+0x180/0x250 [amdgpu] pqm_create_queue+0x32d/0x730 [amdgpu] kfd_ioctl_create_queue+0x583/0x9f0 [amdgpu] Pass the process info of the queue instead. With the fix, the queue is created and destroyed normally. (cherry picked from commit 6b4157498a176bd1c6083f6bb5aaf8a257a2027e) | ||||
| CVE-2026-99657 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/mmu_notifier: set ->mm only after mmgrab() Radeon uses a non-NULL notifier->mm to decide whether to call mmu_interval_notifier_remove() when freeing a buffer object. __mmu_interval_notifier_insert() sets ->mm before validating the range, so a wrapping userptr range can leave ->mm set after insertion fails. Cleanup then tries to remove an unregistered notifier for which no mm reference was acquired. Set ->mm only after mmgrab(), once insertion can no longer fail. While we could fix radeon's code instead, setting ->mm on success only makes the code more robust. Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Chris Mason in private. [ david: simplify description ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-99606 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: don't spin in smc_rx_recvmsg() while a pipe holds spliced data While bytes spliced off the RMB are still in a pipe, recvmsg() waits for the pipe to release them before it copies the data behind them. The path to that wait skips the timeout and signal checks, and smc_rx_wait() returns at once on RCV_SHUTDOWN. With a signal pending, after SHUT_RD, or once the peer closes or shuts down writing, recvmsg() spins on a CPU until the pipe is drained, and SIGKILL cannot stop it. MSG_DONTWAIT and an expired SO_RCVTIMEO wait there too instead of returning -EAGAIN. Check the timeout and signals before that wait, and end it when the pipe releases the data or the connection is killed, not on RCV_SHUTDOWN. A zero-length read returns 0 without waiting for the pipe; a non-blocking one returns -EAGAIN while poll() still reports the socket readable (splice() can still take those bytes). The wait sets SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA like smc_rx_wait(), so a byte arriving behind the pipe raises no SIGIO on a reader already asleep for it, and a full barrier orders its wait queue entry before its read of splice_pending, so no wake is lost. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99608 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 4.6 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usx2y: Guard the playback copy usx2y_urb_play_prepare() sums the packet lengths of a whole URB, copies that many frames with a single wrap, and sizes each playback packet from the capture packet's actual_length. Three things are unchecked: that the URB fits in the ring buffer, that a packet fits in the playback endpoint's maxpacksize, from which tmpbuf is allocated, and that actual_length is a whole number of frames. The ISO descriptors take the raw actual_length while transfer_buffer_length and the copies take count * stride, so a packet that is not a multiple of the stride makes the descriptors add up to more than the buffer, by up to stride - 1 bytes per packet. Return -EPIPE, as the existing packet-size check does, when the URB is larger than the buffer or a packet is larger than maxpacksize, and size each descriptor from whole frames, so the descriptors add up to transfer_buffer_length and each stays within maxpacksize. The buffer case is prevented by the previous patch and this is the guard for it; the other two depend only on the device. The first case is reachable on the unpatched driver with ordinary packets: on 7.3-rc7, a USB/IP device presenting the US-122 interface layout and sending 48-frame packets, with a 100-frame playback buffer (two 50-frame periods, inside the stock constraints), KASAN reports: BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in i_usx2y_urb_complete+0x79b/0x1ac0 Read of size 18446744073709551280 at addr ffff88800e6b02e0 by task vhci_rx/80 With both patches, the same device and a 200-frame playback buffer is refused at hw_params with EINVAL, and a 400-frame buffer plays for 30 s with the position advancing inside the buffer, no KASAN report and neither guard message. The maxpacksize check is not exercised: the emulated device reports the same wMaxPacketSize on both endpoints. The descriptor case is visible with capture packets of 195 bytes at stride 4 (48 frames and 3 bytes): without this change the four descriptors add up to 780 bytes for 768 bytes of data, and USB/IP's completion check refuses the URB ("total length of iso packets 780 not equal to actual length of buffer 768", -EPROTO), after which the driver stops the streams. With this patch every descriptor is 192 bytes, the descriptors add up to the data in every URB for 30 s, the position advances inside the buffer and KASAN reports nothing. The 48-frame playback run above is unchanged. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99615 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 3.4 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: l2tp: only return sessions of the given tunnel in l2tp_session_get() Commit 5f77c18ea556 ("l2tp: use IDR for all session lookups") made pppol2tp_connect() and the netlink session commands find sessions with l2tp_session_get(), passing the socket of the tunnel they name. L2TPv3 session IDs are unique per network namespace, except that sessions carried over UDP are only unique per UDP socket, the socket of their tunnel. However, l2tp_v3_session_get() only checks the socket when another session has the same session ID. Otherwise it returns the session, whichever tunnel it belongs to. As of now, a session command that names the wrong tunnel acts on a session of another tunnel, and a PPPoL2TP socket for a second L2TPv3 tunnel fails with EEXIST, because it finds session 0 of the first tunnel. The issue can be reproduced with: ip l2tp add tunnel tunnel_id 3 peer_tunnel_id 3 encap udp \ local 127.0.0.1 remote 127.0.0.1 udp_sport 5003 udp_dport 6003 ip l2tp add tunnel tunnel_id 4 peer_tunnel_id 4 encap udp \ local 127.0.0.1 remote 127.0.0.1 udp_sport 5004 udp_dport 6004 ip l2tp add session tunnel_id 3 session_id 7 peer_session_id 7 ip l2tp del session tunnel_id 4 session_id 7 ip l2tp show session Before that commit, the delete fails with "No such device", and session 7 of tunnel 3 is still listed. After that commit, the delete succeeds, and session 7 of tunnel 3 is gone. This patch will make l2tp_session_get() return NULL when the L2TPv3 session it finds does not belong to the given socket. The receive path calls l2tp_v3_session_get() directly and is not changed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99666 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/khugepaged: fix PMD table lock leak in try_collapse_pte_mapped_thp() For a private mapping with userfaultfd, try_collapse_pte_mapped_thp() takes the PMD table lock before it maps the page table for the second time. If that (pte_offset_map_rw_nolock) fails, because the page table vanished in the meantime due to concurrent page table reclaim, it leaves through the abort label, where the PMD table lock is unlocked if it differs from PTE table lock. In case the PMD table lock and the PTE table lock match, which is the case without CONFIG_SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS after pte_offset_map_rw_nolock() failed, we miss to unlock the PMD table. To fix it, forget the PTE table lock when we unmap+unlock the PTE table. Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Josef Bacik in private. [ david: move the ptl = NULL handling; rewrite description, drop wrong comments ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-99671 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: raw, isotp: copy socket options outside of lock_sock() The CAN_RAW and CAN_ISOTP specific socket options are copied from and to user space while holding lock_sock(). A copy that faults or stalls, e.g. on a userfaultfd or FUSE backed mapping, holds lock_sock() for its whole duration. raw_notify() and isotp_notify() take lock_sock() of a socket that is bound to the vanishing device while holding RTNL. As the CAN_RAW options can also be changed on a bound socket, a stalled copy can block RTNL on an unregistration or namespace change of the bound device. Before "can: protect the receive lists with a per-device lock", raw_setsockopt() even held RTNL itself during the copy. CAN_ISOTP only copies its options for unbound sockets, which isotp_notify() skips without taking lock_sock(). Keep the user space copies out of the locked sections: Check the option name and length and copy the option values, including the CAN_RAW_FILTER filters, to kernel memory before lock_sock(). raw_setsockopt_locked() and isotp_setsockopt_locked() get the copied values directly and drop their now redundant length checks and copies. As a side effect, a failing copy can not leave partially overwritten options behind anymore. In raw_getsockopt() duplicate the filters under lock_sock() and copy them to user space after release_sock(). As the option name and length are now checked before lock_sock(), the order of the checks in isotp_setsockopt() and accordingly the order of the returned error values changes. This is in line with POSIX, which does not define an order in which multiple error conditions are detected and reported. The generic SOL_SOCKET options in sk_setsockopt() are not affected by this patch. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99566 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: assoc_array: keep gc's cleanup out of the live tree on allocation failure assoc_array_gc() builds a copy of the tree. Where the copy reaches a shortcut, it allocates the copy of the shortcut with kmalloc_flex(), fills it with memcpy(), links it into the new tree, and only then allocates the copy of the node after it. The memcpy() leaves the new shortcut's next_node pointing at the old tree's node, so if that second allocation fails, the cleanup, assoc_array_destroy_subtree() on the new tree, follows the new shortcut into the old tree, and the BUG_ON() on the old node's back pointer fires. Allocate the node first, and the shortcut once the node exists, freeing the node again if the shortcut cannot be allocated. A copied shortcut is then only linked into the new tree when the copy of its node is there to follow it. Nothing else changes: with no allocation failing, the trees gc builds are the same as before. Found by a userspace test that makes each allocation of each operation fail in turn. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99567 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: assoc_array: don't chain a new shortcut onto an existing one When a full node's leaves and the new key all share the node's segment, assoc_array_insert_into_terminal_node() replaces the node with a shortcut to a pair of new nodes. If the node is itself the target of a shortcut, the new shortcut is installed as that shortcut's next node, and a shortcut leading to a shortcut is something nothing expects: assoc_array_walk() indexes the second one as a node, and assoc_array_apply_edit() hits the BUG_ON() in the loop that adjusts nr_leaves_on_branch, on that same insertion. Deletion gets a node there. When the subtree below a shortcut shrinks enough, assoc_array_delete() collapses it into one node below the shortcut, and the leaves it collects can all share that node's segment. The next key that shares it too takes this path. Eighteen insertions and a deletion are enough: sixteen keys that agree on bits 0-11, one that leaves them at bit 8 and is deleted again, and one more that agrees with the sixteen. Have the new shortcut replace the one in front of the node as well. assoc_array_insert_shortcut() gives it that shortcut's back pointer and parent slot, so the caller installs it where that one was, and excises the old shortcut along with the node, which takes a second entry in excised_meta[]. The new shortcut's index key comes from the new key up to the new skip level, so it covers what the old one did. Found by a userspace test doing random insertions and deletions on keys that share long prefixes; a targeted case builds a shortcut, deletes down to the collapse and inserts one more key. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99568 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd/iova_bitmap: Ensure that iova_bitmap_set() handles the full IOVA Generally userspace is going to step the dirty bitmap through the IOVA space. However if the bitmap ends in the middle of a large PTE this is problematic. The first step will clear the dirty bit and report dirty to the end of its bitmap while the second step will see the clear'd dirty and report clean for the start of the bitmap. If it happens this ends up losing dirties. Further this function is missing bounds checking so if this does happen ther is a good chance it will write memory beyond what the userspace was expecting. Return an error code if this illegal condition happens. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99569 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 3.6 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: release a removed xattr node in roll-forward recovery When xattrs shrink enough to fit in the inline xattr area, write_all_xattrs() truncates the xattr node and clears i_xattr_nid. If the file is then fsynced without a checkpoint, only the inode block is written, with i_xattr_nid of 0. Roll-forward recovery starts from the checkpointed inode, whose i_xattr_nid still points to the old xattr node. f2fs_recover_inline_xattr() copies only the inline xattr area, and f2fs_update_inode() writes the old i_xattr_nid back. So the inode keeps the stale xattr node: - The node block is never released, and fsck reports "nonzero bytes in xattr space after end of list". - If the inline xattr list ends exactly at the end of the inline area, its terminator is read from the stale node, and the removed xattrs come back after recovery. When the fsynced inode has no xattr node but the checkpointed one has, release the old xattr node as truncate_node() does: check its block address, invalidate the block and drop its node cache, which may still be dirty. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99572 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 1.9 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix to avoid potential reference count leak in do_garbage_collect() In do_garbage_collect(), we have reserved reference counts on summary cache of all segments, once gc_thread encounter freezing, we need to release all reference counts. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99573 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 6.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: vgic: Stop the target vcpu when disabling LPIs Disabling LPIs is pretty nasty, as it directly messes with the AP list of the affected CPU, which could be running... This has the potential to lead to really bad behaviours, and we should not be doing that. Take example on the way the Active state is handled and simply pause the the vcpu so that we are sure it is in a quiescent state, and the state be safely manipulated. Nobody has any expectation of performance for this anyway. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99574 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: bound the SIT/NAT bitmaps by the checkpoint pack sit_ver_bitmap_bytesize and nat_ver_bitmap_bytesize are used as memcpy lengths into and out of sbi->ckpt, which is sized from cp_payload alone, and nothing compares either length against that allocation. sanity_check_ckpt() has checked these two fields since c77ec61ca0a4, which added them after a crafted image overran build_sit_info(). That check ties each length to a segment count; it never compares either against the allocation, which is the half this adds. Mounting over-reads in build_sit_info() and build_node_manager(), and the first checkpoint writes the same lengths back through the same pointers, so the over-read's contents reach the on-disk checkpoint. An unmount is enough; the filesystem does not have to be used. Bound both ends the way __bitmap_ptr() lays them out. The three branches differ, so a single sum of the two lengths would still admit a small overflow when cp_payload is non-zero. | ||||