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CVE Vendors Products Updated CVSS v3.1
CVE-2026-99492 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: wacom: Advertise SW_MUTE_DEVICE capability prior to registration Input subsystem guidelines require that device capabilities are advertised before the input device is registered. The Wacom driver was violating this by advertising the SW_MUTE_DEVICE capability post-registration in wacom_set_shared_values() (and duplicating it in device-specific setup cases). Resolve this by moving the SW_MUTE_DEVICE capability setup to wacom_setup_touch_input_capabilities() for all touch devices that support it. For generic touch devices whose capabilities depend on mute switch usages parsed from a sibling Pen/Pad interface, defer registration with -EPROBE_DEFER until the sibling has parsed its descriptors and initialized shared capabilities.
CVE-2026-99491 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: wacom: Fix Use-After-Free in wacom_intuos_pad wacom_intuos_pad() accesses wacom->shared->touch_input locklessly inside the interrupt handler context. If the Touch sibling device is disconnected, wacom_remove_shared_data() clears 'touch_input' outside any lock, creating a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition where a preempted reader in interrupt context dereferences the freed pointer, leading to a Use-After-Free. Resolve this by introducing RCU protection for the touch_input pointer: - Annotate 'touch_input' in wacom_shared struct with __rcu - Wrap all lockless readers in wacom_wac.c with guard(rcu)() and rcu_dereference() using a unified wacom_report_touch_mute() helper - Update writers in wacom_sys.c using rcu_assign_pointer() - Call synchronize_rcu() in wacom_remove_shared_data() to ensure all active RCU readers have finished before the input device is freed Also wrap wacom_set_shared_values() and touch/pen assignments in wacom_add_shared_data() inside the wacom_udev_list_lock to serialize concurrent probe assignments, and verify that 'shared->touch == hdev' before setting touch_input to prevent concurrent sibling probe state desynchronization.
CVE-2026-99490 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: wacom: Fix Use-After-Free in wacom_bamboo_pad wacom_bamboo_pad_pen_event() accesses wacom->shared->pen locklessly relative to wacom_remove_shared_data() which nullifies it. This can lead to a Use-After-Free if the sibling device is removed while events are being processed. Resolve this by introducing RCU protection for pen and touch pointers: - Annotate 'pen' and 'touch' in wacom_shared struct with __rcu. - Wrap lockless readers in wacom_bamboo_pad_pen_event() with rcu_read_lock() and rcu_dereference(). - Update writers in wacom_sys.c using rcu_assign_pointer(). - Use rcu_dereference_protected for comparisons under wacom_udev_list_lock. - Also use rcu_access_pointer in wacom_sibling_pending() and wacom_mode_change_work() to avoid warnings (while lockless access in the latter remains a pre-existing issue).
CVE-2026-99489 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: wacom: Redesign shared sibling data lifecycle The Wacom driver coordinates state between sibling interfaces of the same physical device using a shared structure 'wacom_shared' inside 'wacom_hdev_data'. The driver kept a volatile representative pointer 'data->dev' pointing to a sibling 'hid_device' for physical path comparisons during sibling matching. This pointer management is fragile. When the representative device is disconnected, wacom_remove_shared_data() failed to clear/update 'data->dev', leading to a Use-After-Free vulnerability when subsequent sibling probes dereference the dangling 'data->dev' pointer. Resolve this issue by redesigning the sibling data lifecycle: - Eliminate the volatile 'data->dev' representative pointer completely - Redesign 'wacom_hdev_data' to store stable static copies of the required attributes upon first allocation: 'phys' path string, 'vendor', 'product' IDs and the sibling's 'device_type' - Use these static attributes for stable sibling matching in wacom_are_sibling() and wacom_get_hdev_data() This ensures sibling matching remains safe and stable even if individual siblings are dynamically added or removed. To secure the lifecycle against concurrent probe/disconnect races: - Switch kref_put() to kref_put_mutex() in wacom_remove_shared_data() to serialize refcount drops with list traversal and lookup - Modify wacom_release_shared_data() to assume the list lock is already held Also, do not accumulate the 'device_type' capability flag during subsequent sibling probes. Keeping only the first probed sibling's device_type exactly preserves the original sibling matching behavior without introducing side effects.
CVE-2026-99488 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: klist: avoid accesses after waking klist_remove() klist_remove() waits until a node is unreferenced so that its caller can free the containing object. klist_release() currently publishes waiter->woken and wakes the waiter before its final accesses to the waiter and node. klist_remove() can then return, allowing its stack waiter and the containing object to be freed or reused while klist_release() is still running. In particular, bus_remove_driver() can free drv->p while __device_attach() walks the same bus klist with bus_for_each_drv(). On an arm64 Cortex-A72 system, an unpatched 7.2.0-rc3 kernel with CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y and CONFIG_KASAN=y reproduced the bug through the in-tree I2C/at24 path. KASAN reported a use-after-free in klist_dec_and_del() reached from klist_next()/bus_for_each_drv() while at24 was being unregistered. Clear n_klist and take a task reference before publishing woken. Use release/acquire accesses for that publication and wake the referenced task. The task reference keeps the waiter task alive if it returns and exits before wake_up_process().
CVE-2026-99487 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rust: bug: pass TAINT_WARN to warn_slowpath_fmt() on UML On UML, `warn_flags!` calls `warn_slowpath_fmt()` directly. Its third argument is a taint number, but `warn_on!` passes its bug flags there. As a result, `add_taint()` gets 2304 instead of 9 (`TAINT_WARN`). The warning is not recorded: `/proc/sys/kernel/tainted` stays 0 after `warn_on!` fires, where it should be 512. It also causes an out-of-bounds write in `add_taint()`. Pass `TAINT_WARN` directly, as C does on UML.
CVE-2026-99486 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rust: configfs: fix data offset calculation for subsystem callbacks `get_group_data()` chooses between `Group::<Parent>::container_of()` and `Subsystem::<Parent>::container_of()` based on whether `this` represents the root group of a configfs subsystem. It detects this by checking `(*this).cg_subsys.is_null()`, but `link_group()` in `fs/configfs/dir.c` unconditionally sets `cg_subsys` for every `config_group` attached anywhere in a registered subsystem, including the subsystem's own `su_group`. The only `config_group` with a NULL `cg_subsys` is the configfs root, on which userspace cannot trigger callbacks. The check is therefore always false at runtime, and the `Subsystem` branch is dead. Subsystem-level callbacks reach the `Group` branch and may read `data` at the wrong offset. Thus change the `is_root` check to correctly identify whether a group is a root group by comparing `this` to `subsys.su_group`. [ Andreas: Fix clippy warning on 1.85.0 by moving safety comment. ]
CVE-2026-99485 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/amdxdna: clear the mailbox channel pointer when starting it fails aie2_create_context() allocates a mailbox channel, starts it, and on a failed start frees it again: hwctx->priv->mbox_chann = xdna_mailbox_alloc_channel(ndev->mbox); ... ret = xdna_mailbox_start_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann, ...); if (ret) goto free_channel; ... free_channel: xdna_mailbox_free_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann); hwctx->priv->mbox_chann keeps pointing at the freed channel. That pointer is the driver's own test for whether a hardware context has a usable channel: aie2_destroy_context() returns early on NULL, aie2_sched_job_run() refuses to run a job on NULL, and the message helpers return -ENODEV on NULL. A stale pointer passes all of them. It matters on the restart path. aie2_hwctx_restart() calls aie2_create_context() again on a hardware context that is already live, after aie2_hwctx_stop() has torn its channel down, and the context survives a failure there: aie2_sched_job_timedout() discards the return value entirely, and aie2_hwctx_resume() only propagates it. What is left is a live hardware context holding a freed channel, and every later user of it takes the non-NULL branch: - the next job submitted reaches xdna_mailbox_send_msg() on the freed channel, via the !mbox_chann guard in aie2_sched_job_run(), - a second command timeout reaches aie2_hwctx_stop() -> aie2_destroy_context(), - closing the device reaches aie2_hwctx_fini() -> aie2_release_resource() -> xrs_release_resource() -> aie2_xrs_unload() -> aie2_destroy_context(), and aie2_destroy_context() then calls xdna_mailbox_stop_channel() followed by xdna_mailbox_free_channel() on memory that was already freed: a use-after-free, and a second free of the same channel. The AIE4 management channel already does this correctly - aie4_mailbox_start() clears ndev->aie.mgmt_chann right after freeing it. Do the same here. The create path itself is not affected: when aie2_xrs_load() fails, xrs_allocate_resource() removes the solver node without calling ->unload, and aie2_hwctx_init() frees hwctx->priv, so the stale pointer never outlives the structure holding it. Starting a channel can fail today without this patch: the ring buffer sizes firmware reports are rejected unless both are powers of two, and request_irq() can fail.
CVE-2026-99484 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: emux: Fix UAF of soundfont zones at note-on snd_emux_note_on() looks up the matching zones via snd_soundfont_search_zone(), which takes sflist->lock only during the lookup and returns the raw zone pointers after releasing it. The caller then stores them in vp->zone without any protection. Meanwhile, a concurrent SNDRV_EMUX_IOCTL_REMOVE_LAST_SAMPLES ioctl may unlink and free those zones in snd_soundfont_remove_unlocked(); this leads to a use-after-free in snd_emux_note_on(), and later at accessing the cached vp->zone, e.g. in snd_emux_send_effect(). Fix it by holding sflist->lock in snd_emux_note_on() over the whole zone lookup and voice setup, and let snd_soundfont_search_zone() require the caller to hold the lock, instead. snd_soundfont_lock_preset() takes sflist->lock for setting presets_locked, so the removal path now syncs with the note-on finish.
CVE-2026-99483 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: pcmtest: handle multiple wraps in random capture fill The random capture helpers assume that the data generated for one timer tick wraps the DMA ring at most once. However, b_rw describes 200 ms of audio because the timer runs at 5 Hz, so it can be several times larger than a small ring. For 48 kHz, S16_LE, four-channel capture with a 512-frame buffer, the DMA ring is 4096 bytes while one tick generates 76800 bytes. After filling the 4096-byte tail, the existing code issues a second 72704-byte write from the ring base, writing 68608 bytes beyond the ring. Both interleaved and non-interleaved capture are affected. KASAN reports the first write into the adjacent free page as a use-after-free in the random-byte generator. The underlying defect is an out-of-bounds write from the live DMA ring, not a stale DMA allocation. Split each random write repeatedly at the interleaved ring or per-channel block boundary. Keep the hardware-pointer update exactly once after the complete logical write. The issue reproduced on three of three clean boots. With this change, the same vulnerable geometry completed six times without a sanitizer finding. Boundary, pattern-fill, no-timer, open/close, and module-reload controls also completed normally. snd-pcmtest is a test driver, and selecting random fill requires an administrator-controlled module parameter. The written values come from the kernel random generator; no privilege escalation or attacker-controlled write primitive was demonstrated.
CVE-2026-99482 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: amd: ps: fix snd_acp63_remove() teardown ordering The ACP IRQ handlers dereference the SoundWire, SoundWire DMA, and PDM child platform devices, but snd_acp63_remove() unregisters them while the interrupt is still held by devres, which frees it only after remove returns. An interrupt in this window is a use-after-free. Mask the ACP interrupt sources and call devm_free_irq() before the first child device is unregistered. The masking goes through the new acp_hw_ops->disable_interrupts callback, keeping the remove path platform-agnostic. The interrupt line is shared, and acp_hw_deinit() clears the sources only after the children are gone, which would leave the line raised with no handler left to ack it. The window predates the tagged refactor, which only reshaped the dereferences. devm_free_irq() waits for in-flight handlers, but not for work the hardirq has already queued: acp63_irq_handler() schedules amd_sdw_irq_thread on the SoundWire manager. Draining that work in the manager's remove path is a soundwire-side change and follows separately. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.
CVE-2026-99481 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_vhci: Pin module for debugfs file operations An open debugfs file retains its file_operations pointer in the debugfs proxy state. However, force_suspend_fops, force_wakeup_fops, aosp_capable_fops, and force_devcoredump_fops have no .owner set to THIS_MODULE. As a result, full_proxy_open_regular() calls fops_get() which succeeds without taking a reference to the hci_vhci module. When userspace opens any of these debugfs files and later closes the /dev/vhci file descriptor (triggering vhci_release() and debugfs file removal), the open debugfs file descriptor remains valid in userspace. Because the module refcount was not incremented, the hci_vhci module can be unloaded via delete_module (rmmod hci_vhci). When the userspace process subsequently closes the debugfs file descriptor, full_proxy_release() accesses the already unmapped file_operations structure, resulting in a kernel page fault / oops: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff846f18b #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:full_proxy_release+0x8e/0x140 Call Trace: <TASK> __fput+0x39f/0xa60 fput_close_sync+0xff/0x200 __x64_sys_close+0x8c/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e </TASK> Modules linked in: ... [last unloaded: hci_vhci(E)] The issue was discovered via manual code audit of drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c and verified on a Linux 7.3-rc6 test VM with CONFIG_BT_VHCI=m by keeping a debugfs file open across controller teardown and module unload. Set .owner = THIS_MODULE on all four file_operations structures so that debugfs pins the module until all file descriptors are closed.
CVE-2026-99480 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/panthor: Fix TOCTOU race between GROUP_REGISTERED check and erase panthor_group_destroy() checks the GROUP_REGISTERED mark and then calls xa_erase() without holding the xarray lock across both. If the handle is destroyed by another thread in between, and a concurrent GROUP_CREATE reuses the freed ID, the first destroy erases and releases the new, still-initializing group, leading to a use-after-free in panthor_group_create(). Do the mark check and erase atomically under xa_lock().
CVE-2026-99479 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: atmel_lcdfb: Prevent FIFO work after removal The LCD controller IRQ schedules sinfo->task to recover from a FIFO underflow. Probe currently requests the IRQ before initializing the work, so an early interrupt can schedule an uninitialized work item. The probe error path and remove path cancel the work before freeing the IRQ. A FIFO-underflow interrupt can schedule the work again after that cancellation. framebuffer_release() may then free sinfo while the work is still pending. KASAN reported a use-after-free in atmel_lcdfb_task() when an underflow interrupt occurred during removal. With the IRQ freed before the work was cancelled, the same test completed without a kernel diagnostic. Initialize the work before requesting the IRQ. In both cleanup paths, free the IRQ before cancelling the work so that it cannot be scheduled again after cancellation.
CVE-2026-99478 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: filelock: keep superblock active through delegation wait A caller may drop its path after try_break_deleg() returns a delegated inode but before break_deleg_wait() finishes. The extra inode reference held in struct delegated_inode does not keep the superblock active. After a lazy unmount, closing the delegation holder can release the last mount reference and shut down the superblock while another task waits for the delegation break. The waiter's final iput() can then enter the filesystem's eviction code after its superblock-private state was freed. This has been observed as a KASAN use-after-free in shmem_evict_inode(). When try_break_deleg() saves a delegated inode, take an active reference to its superblock while the caller still pins the mount. Keep that reference through break_deleg_wait() and the final iput(), then release it with deactivate_super(). This protects every caller of the helpers, including the mknod, mkdir, symlink and rmdir paths that drop their path before waiting.
CVE-2026-99477 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/proc/task_mmu: pin mm_users in do_pagemap_scan() The PAGEMAP_SCAN ioctl takes mmap_read_lock() on an mm obtained from /proc/<pid>/pagemap without holding a reference to mm_users. proc_mem_open() deliberately grabs only mm_count, so a consumer that touches the address space has to call mmget_not_zero() first. Every other consumer in this file does -- m_start(), do_procmap_query(), show_smaps_rollup() and pagemap_read() -- but do_pagemap_scan() does not. Without that reference the target can reach exit_mmap() concurrently, and exit_mmap() calls unmap_vmas() while holding mmap_lock only for reading, which does not exclude the scanner. For ordinary VMAs this is harmless, as free_pgtables() and remove_vma() run afterwards under mmap_write_lock. A shared hugetlb VMA is different: __hugetlb_zap_end() frees the VMA's hugetlb_vma_lock inside the read-locked phase. walk_hugetlb_range() can therefore load vma->vm_private_data, have the lock freed underneath it, and then down_read() a freed rw_semaphore. The load happens before the freeing side clears the pointer, so this is a use-after-free and not a NULL dereference. Any unprivileged user can reach it with no huge pages configured, as hugetlb_reserve_pages() allocates the lock before the VM_NORESERVE early return. Pin mm_users across the scan, the way the other consumers do. mmput() from the exiting task can then no longer reach exit_mmap() while a walk is in progress. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded & undesirable test for !mm]
CVE-2026-99476 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fsverity: Set S_VERITY only after rollback is no longer possible Commit f77f281b6118 ("fsverity: use a hashtable to find the fsverity_info") changed the implementation of FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY to make concurrent reads start going through fsverity verification slightly earlier than they did before. Instead of it happening when enable_verity() calls fsverity_set_info(), it now happens when ->end_enable_verity() sets S_VERITY. However, ext4 and btrfs can roll back verity after they set S_VERITY, causing a use-after-free. Fix that by making ext4 and btrfs set S_VERITY only after rollback is no longer possible. On failure, don't roll back S_VERITY, but do roll back the filesystem-specific verity flag. Also update enable_verity() to handle any future instances of this bug more safely by warning and *not* freeing the fsverity_info. Finally, tweak some comments. Clarify one, and move information from another to its proper place in the comment for ->end_enable_verity().
CVE-2026-99475 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: genirq: Defer kfree(irqaction) until irq_thread_dtor() finishes When an interrupt thread exits abnormally via do_exit() (e.g. the interrupt handler oopses) without returning from irq_thread(), a concurrent call to free_irq() could free the irqaction before the irq_thread_dtor() exit task work runs. irq thread (oopsed) free_irq() ------------------- ---------- do_exit() exit_mm() complete_vfork_done() -------> kthread_stop() returns exit_files() ... kfree(action) exit_task_work() irq_thread_dtor() action->... <- use-after-free Track the pending exit work with the IRQTF_EXIT_WORK thread flag, and have __free_irq() wait for the bit to clear before kfree(). irq_thread_dtor() only runs on irq_thread abnormal exit. If that dtor also faults, free_irq() will hang indefinitely, but double IRQ thread faults require a reboot anyways. [ tglx: Add missing include ]
CVE-2026-99474 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: hiddev: keep state alive through disconnect unlock mutex_unlock() clears the mutex owner before taking its wait lock. A thread spinning in the final hiddev file release can acquire existancelock after hiddev_disconnect() clears the owner, then free hiddev before the disconnecting thread reaches the mutex wait lock. This causes a use-after-free in the mutex slow unlock path. Give the connection and each open file an explicit reference. Drop each reference only after its existancelock critical section has completed, so neither unlock path can free the mutex while the other is still using it.
CVE-2026-99473 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: guest_memfd: Gracefully handle xarray errors when binding a memslot If inserting a memslot into a guest_memfd's bindings xarray fails, propagate the error back to the caller, i.e. fail memslot creation as well. Signalling success and continuing on with memslot creation results in use-after-free, as the guest_memfd instance will remain reachable via the memslot after the file is freed (kvm_gmem_release() won't nullify the file pointer due to lack of a valid binding). Opportunistically WARN and reject binding if KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY is already set, partly to guard against goofs elsewhere, but mostly so that KVM doesn't need to worry about clobbering flags when unwinding on failure. Regarding the unwind, the slot must be fully prepared before inserting it into the bindings, at which point the slot becomes reachable. I.e. waiting to update the slot in order to avoid the ugly unwind isn't an option. And as part of the unwind, explicitly nullify the relevant bindings, as xarray can store a subset of entries when populating a range.