| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in PublishPress PublishPress Series organize-series allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects PublishPress Series: from n/a through 3.1.3. |
| The File Uploads Addon for WooCommerce WordPress plugin before 1.7.6 does not verify that the person requesting a customer-uploaded file is the customer who uploaded it, allowing unauthenticated attackers who know or guess a file's name to download other customers' uploaded files. |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Ahmad JS Help Desk js-support-ticket allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects JS Help Desk: from n/a through 4.0.0. |
| The checkout of JTL-Shop stores the delivery address
ID submitted by the customer in the session and adopts it into the order
without verifying that the address belongs to the ordering customer. A remote
attacker with access to the checkout, including a guest, can thereby attach
the delivery address of another customer to their own order. Name and
address of the other customer, and depending on the shop configuration
further contact data, then appear in the order confirmation and customer
account. As the IDs are sequential, addresses can be enumerated. Goods may
also be shipped to the wrong address. |
| The Checkout Field Manager (Checkout Manager) for WooCommerce WordPress plugin before 7.9.7 does not properly validate the ownership of an attachment before deleting it, allowing any authenticated user such as a customer to delete arbitrary media attachments belonging to other users. |
| Dell PowerStore contains an authorization bypass vulnerability. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to act under another user's session, potentially leading to denial of service. |
| The Essential Real Estate WordPress plugin before 5.3.5 does not verify ownership of an invoice before rendering it in one of its AJAX actions, allowing an authenticated low-privileged user to read other users' invoices, including the invoice owner's name, account email address and financial details. |
| The UniPAY Payment Gateway For WooCommerce WordPress plugin before 2.4 does not perform any authorization check before returning an order's order-received URL for an attacker-supplied order id, exposing the order's secret key in the redirect and allowing unauthenticated attackers to enumerate orders and disclose customers' personal data (name, email address, phone number and address). |
| SAP NetWeaver Application Server Java (NWDI Cockpit)� does not perform sufficient authorization checks for certain functionality that retrieves sensitive information. An attacker with low privileges could send a specially crafted request to access sensitive information belonging to other system users. Successful exploitation results in a high impact on confidentiality, with no impact on integrity or availability of the application. |
| djangocms-versioning is a general-purpose versioning package for django CMS 4 and later. Prior to 2.6.1, the check_discard and check_edit_redirect Conditions on djangocms_versioning.models.Version omit user_can_change, while VersionAdmin.discard_view and VersionAdmin.edit_redirect_view obtain a version by its primary key and rely on those conditions for object-level authorization. With CMS_PERMISSION set to True, the affected views are gated only by is_staff, allowing any staff user to select content without object-level change permission. With the default CMS_PERMISSION value of False, a staff user must also hold the global Django change_ permission, but that model-level permission does not enforce the intended per-object authorization, so the user can delete a draft version and its content object through discard or create an editable draft from a published version through edit_redirect even when the user cannot change that specific content object. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.1. |
| django-filer is a file and image management application for Django. Prior to 3.5.0, the delete_files_or_folders action in filer/admin/folderadmin.py checks global Django model-level deletion permission but omits check_folder_edit_permissions and check_files_edit_permissions when FILER_ENABLE_PERMISSIONS is enabled. An authenticated staff user who has a global delete_file, delete_folder, or delete_image permission but is limited to read-only access by FolderPermission can therefore delete files, folders, and descendants from the restricted folder. Deployments using the default disabled per-folder permission system are not affected, and the issue does not create a read-confidentiality impact. This issue is fixed in version 3.5.0. |
| djangocms-moderation provides an approval workflow mechanism for organizations that require content approval before publication. Prior to 2.4.0, CollectionCommentAdmin and RequestCommentAdmin in the Django admin use changelist_view and changeform_view to scope comment access through caller-controlled object identifiers and model-level view_collectioncomment or view_requestcomment permissions without invoking ModerationRequest.user_can_view_comments() or an equivalent collection participant check. An authenticated staff user with either view permission can enumerate collection or moderation-request identifiers and read full comment messages for workflows they do not participate in. The exposure affects confidentiality of internal editorial discussions; comment creation, modification, and deletion remain protected, and integrity and availability are unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0. |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1.3, 2025.11.7 improper authorization allowed viewing build process details via agent stacktraces |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1.3, 2025.11.7 DoS via agent command results was possible |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a caller of an identity-configured tool to update or destroy records it never identified, including every row in the table.
In AshAi.Tool.Execution, identity_filter/3 built the update/destroy filter directly from the raw tool arguments as [{key, Map.get(arguments, to_string(key))}] and passed it to Ash.Query.do_filter/2. A map value is parsed as a predicate expression rather than a literal, so a caller can send {"public_ref": {"not_eq": "<own-ref>"}} and, combined with Ash.Query.limit(1) and Ash.bulk_update!/Ash.bulk_destroy!, retarget the write at a record it never identified; an omitted key yields an IS NULL filter that matches an arbitrary row. The fix casts each identity value to the field type, rejecting non-scalar inputs.
This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.6.0 before 1.0.0. |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.
AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.
This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1. |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets an attacker who controls filter form parameters filter across relationships the resource author marked non-public, turning the returned rows into a boolean oracle over private related data.
AshPhoenix.FilterForm resolved every relationship hop in the user-supplied path with Ash.Resource.Info.related/2, which traverses private relationships, and only checked the terminal field for publicity. parse_path_and_field/2 also rewrote a field naming a relationship into an extra path segment, so field=some_private_rel was accepted too. Both path and field come straight from form params, and the resulting ref went to Ash.Query.do_filter/2 without the public-only enforcement of Ash.Filter.parse_input/2. The fix resolves each hop with Ash.Resource.Info.public_relationship/2, rejecting the first non-public hop, and requires the terminal field to be public.
This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 0.6.0-rc.1 before 2.3.25. |
| MISP contains an authorization flaw in the GalaxyCluster model's captureCluster() function, which handles the import and synchronization of Galaxy Clusters. Prior to the fix, any authenticated user holding the galaxy editor role could replace an existing locked Galaxy Cluster by supplying its UUID in an import request, regardless of which organization owned the cluster. The function unconditionally called captureOrganisationAndSG() before the save operation, overwriting the cluster's org_id and orgc_id fields with the importing user's organization, effectively transferring ownership of the cluster to the attacker's organization. Additionally, the save operation was not restricted to a specific set of fields, allowing arbitrary field modification.
The vulnerable behavior required the attacker to possess a valid MISP account with the perm_galaxy_editor role and to know or discover the UUID of a target cluster belonging to another organization. No site-admin or owner-organization privilege was enforced for the update path. The result was that a low-privilege galaxy editor in one organization could modify the content (value, description, distribution, etc.) of clusters owned by other organizations and seize ownership, corrupting the integrity of shared threat-intelligence data across the MISP instance.
The vulnerability was reported by ENISA and CERT.pl. The fix introduces an explicit authorization gate that restricts cluster updates to the owner organization, a sync user who can see the cluster via sharing-group rules, or a site administrator, and enforces a field allow-list that excludes org_id and orgc_id from update writes, preserving original ownership. |
| Mattermost versions 11.7.x <= 11.7.11 fail to scope an incoming webhook's direct message target to the webhook's own team, which allows a team administrator to deliver a direct message to a user on a team they have no authority over via a webhook whose posting identity belongs to both teams.. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-00751 |
| MISP contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the Galaxy import/sync functionality (captureGalaxy in app/Model/Galaxy.php). The captureGalaxy() method matched an incoming galaxy payload to an existing galaxy by UUID and unconditionally overwrote the matched record, regardless of whether the importing user belonged to the owning organization or whether the galaxy was a system-provided default galaxy. Any authenticated user holding the perm_galaxy_editor role could therefore: (1) demote a default galaxy by setting its default flag to false, (2) reassign the galaxy's org_id and orgc_id to the attacker's organization, effectively taking ownership, and (3) modify other galaxy fields (name, description, distribution, version). Additionally, the role-level permission check (perm_site_admin or perm_galaxy_editor) was executed after the captureOrganisationAndSG() call, meaning organization and sharing-group data was already captured before the authorization decision was made. The vulnerability requires an authenticated user with the perm_galaxy_editor role and the ability to submit a galaxy import payload containing a UUID that matches an existing galaxy. The security impact is loss of data integrity across the MISP instance: default galaxy definitions are corrupted, cross-organization ownership is silently transferred, and the integrity of shared threat-intelligence galaxy metadata is compromised for all users of the instance. |