| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| MISP contains an authorization flaw in the GalaxyCluster model's captureCluster() function, which handles the import and synchronization of Galaxy Clusters. Prior to the fix, any authenticated user holding the galaxy editor role could replace an existing locked Galaxy Cluster by supplying its UUID in an import request, regardless of which organization owned the cluster. The function unconditionally called captureOrganisationAndSG() before the save operation, overwriting the cluster's org_id and orgc_id fields with the importing user's organization, effectively transferring ownership of the cluster to the attacker's organization. Additionally, the save operation was not restricted to a specific set of fields, allowing arbitrary field modification.
The vulnerable behavior required the attacker to possess a valid MISP account with the perm_galaxy_editor role and to know or discover the UUID of a target cluster belonging to another organization. No site-admin or owner-organization privilege was enforced for the update path. The result was that a low-privilege galaxy editor in one organization could modify the content (value, description, distribution, etc.) of clusters owned by other organizations and seize ownership, corrupting the integrity of shared threat-intelligence data across the MISP instance.
The vulnerability was reported by ENISA and CERT.pl. The fix introduces an explicit authorization gate that restricts cluster updates to the owner organization, a sync user who can see the cluster via sharing-group rules, or a site administrator, and enforces a field allow-list that excludes org_id and orgc_id from update writes, preserving original ownership. |
| MISP (Malware Information Sharing Platform) contains an authorization bypass in the SharingGroup model's captureSGExisting method. The authorization check used a logical AND condition that effectively exempted users with the sync permission (perm_sync) from the membership verification. Specifically, the original condition 'if (!checkIfAuthorised(...) && !perm_sync) return false' meant that any user holding the sync role would pass the check regardless of whether they were actually a member of the target sharing group.
A sync user who knows or can discover the UUID of a non-local sharing group could exploit this flaw through the /sharing_groups/add endpoint or by embedding a SharingGroup object in pushed sync data. The attacker could rewrite the sharing group record to add their own organisation as a member or insert an all_orgs server entry for their MISP instance, thereby gaining read access to all events contained in that group. This exposes threat intelligence data that was intended to be restricted to the group's legitimate members.
The vulnerability requires an authenticated account with the sync role and knowledge of a valid sharing group UUID. No user interaction is required. The impact is unauthorized disclosure of shared threat intelligence events and limited integrity modification of the sharing group record. |
| MISP contains an authorization bypass in its event search and filter functionality. When a user performed searches through events/restSearch (value, value prefix, searchall, type, uuid, attribute tags, object filters), objects/restSearch, or the event index tag, galaxy, and quick filters, the underlying SQL subqueries matched against attributes and objects without enforcing the per-attribute distribution, sharing-group, or soft-deleted visibility rules that apply when fetching individual elements.
A user who could view an event (for example, a community-distributed event) could therefore use search to determine whether organisation-only, sharing-group-restricted, or soft-deleted attributes and objects existed within that event. Because the value filter supports prefix matching (LIKE), an attacker could enumerate the full value of a hidden attribute one character at a time. Tags attached exclusively to hidden attributes also leaked through the tag, galaxy, and quick-filter paths on the event index.
The vulnerability affects the EventsController quick-filter and index-filter logic, the Event model wildcard/value/uuid/tag filter methods, the MispAttribute tag filter, the MispObject buildFilterConditions and restSearch methods, and the ReportFromEvent object filter. Site administrators and users belonging to the event's own organisation retain full visibility, and sync users continue to match soft-deleted elements as intended.
The issue was reported by ENISA. |
| MISP's EventDelegationsController delegateEvent method accepted a user-supplied sharing_group_id parameter without verifying that the requesting user was a member of the referenced sharing group. When a delegation request was submitted with distribution set to 4 (sharing-group distribution), the raw sharing_group_id value was stored directly into the EventDelegation record. The delegation view subsequently rendered the stored sharing group's name back to the requester. Because no authorization check was performed, any authenticated user with delegation permission could enumerate sharing group identifiers (by guessing sequential IDs or other values) and read the names of sharing groups to which their organisation did not belong, including hidden or restricted groups. Hidden, missing, and malformed identifiers were not distinguished in the response, but the successful case still leaked the group name. The vulnerability required an authenticated session with the perm_delegate capability and knowledge of a valid event ID to delegate. The security impact is limited to disclosure of sharing group names (a low-impact confidentiality breach) and does not grant access to the group's contents or modify any data. |
| MISP contains an access control flaw in its tag management endpoints: events/addTag (single and bulk), events/removeTag, and attributes/removeTag. These endpoints loaded their target event or attribute using an unscoped database query (recursive = -1) that did not apply the calling user's ACL visibility rules. As a result, two distinct security issues existed: (1) Information disclosure: the removeTag endpoint returned different responses depending on whether a given tag was present on a hidden event, allowing an authenticated user to enumerate which tags were applied to events they had no visibility into. (2) Unauthorized modification: users belonging to the host organisation, who are permitted to set local tags on records they can see, could add or remove local tags on events and attributes they could not see, because the canModifyTag ACL check operated on the unscoped object without first verifying the caller's visibility. The fix replaces the unscoped find() calls with ACL-aware fetch methods (fetchSimpleEvent and fetchAttributeSimple) that apply the user's visibility before the object is returned, and adds an explicit empty-object check in removeTag so that a hidden event responds identically to a non-existent one. Affected components include the EventsController (addTag, removeTag), the AttributesController (removeTag), and the ACLComponent (canModifyTag). The vulnerability requires an authenticated user with at least the tagger role (perm_tagger) or host-organisation membership. |
| MISP contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the Sighting model when the Sightings_anonymise setting is enabled. The listSightings and sightings/restSearch endpoints accepted a caller-supplied org_id filter parameter and applied it directly to the SQL query without verifying whether the requesting user was authorized to filter by that organisation. Because the anonymization mechanism masks the reporter's organisation in the returned records, a non-site-admin user could bypass the anonymization by specifying another organisation's ID in the filter. The query would then return only that organisation's sightings, effectively naming the reporter and defeating the purpose of the anonymization feature. A negated filter (NOT IN) similarly revealed which sightings belonged to the target organisation by exclusion. The vulnerability requires an authenticated user with sighting read permissions (perm_sighting) who is not a site administrator, and the Sightings_anonymise plugin setting must be enabled. The security impact is the disclosure of which organisation reported a given sighting, undermining the privacy guarantees that the anonymization feature is designed to provide. This issue was reported by ENISA. |
| MISP contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the Galaxy import/sync functionality (captureGalaxy in app/Model/Galaxy.php). The captureGalaxy() method matched an incoming galaxy payload to an existing galaxy by UUID and unconditionally overwrote the matched record, regardless of whether the importing user belonged to the owning organization or whether the galaxy was a system-provided default galaxy. Any authenticated user holding the perm_galaxy_editor role could therefore: (1) demote a default galaxy by setting its default flag to false, (2) reassign the galaxy's org_id and orgc_id to the attacker's organization, effectively taking ownership, and (3) modify other galaxy fields (name, description, distribution, version). Additionally, the role-level permission check (perm_site_admin or perm_galaxy_editor) was executed after the captureOrganisationAndSG() call, meaning organization and sharing-group data was already captured before the authorization decision was made. The vulnerability requires an authenticated user with the perm_galaxy_editor role and the ability to submit a galaxy import payload containing a UUID that matches an existing galaxy. The security impact is loss of data integrity across the MISP instance: default galaxy definitions are corrupted, cross-organization ownership is silently transferred, and the integrity of shared threat-intelligence galaxy metadata is compromised for all users of the instance. |
| MISP contains an authorization flaw in the user login-email change logic. When an external authentication backend is configured (LDAP, Shibboleth, ApacheSecureAuth, or CustomAuth), the login email address serves as the key by which the directory service resolves a user's identity, organization, and role on each login. The __canChangeLogin() method in UsersController only checked the MISP.disable_user_login_change setting and site-admin status; it did not account for whether an external authentication backend was active. As a result, any authenticated non-admin user (including org admins) could change their own login email to an address that matches a higher-privilege account in the external directory. On the user's next login, the external backend would resolve that email to the target directory identity, granting the attacker the organization and role associated with that identity. This constitutes an account-identity capture and privilege escalation: the attacker effectively assumes the identity of any directory account whose email they can guess or discover. The vulnerability requires an authenticated session with a valid API key or session token and a MISP instance configured with at least one external authentication backend. The impact is limited to the scope of the captured directory identity's privileges within MISP. |
| The MISP Modules website component contains an open redirect vulnerability in its login endpoint. The /login route accepted a user-supplied next query parameter and passed it directly to Flask's redirect() function without validating the destination. An attacker could craft a URL such as https://victim-host/login?next=https://attacker.example/phish and deliver it to a user (e.g., via email or a lookalike page). After the user successfully authenticated, the application issued a 302 redirect to the attacker-controlled external URL. This enables phishing attacks where a user, believing they are still on the legitimate MISP Modules site, may enter additional credentials or sensitive information on the attacker's page. It can also be used to obscure the true destination of a link, bypassing user trust in the legitimate domain. The vulnerability requires the victim to interact with the crafted URL and complete a login, but no prior authentication or special configuration is needed on the attacker's side. The affected component is the website sub-project of misp-modules, specifically the account blueprint in website/app/account/account.py. No version boundaries are specified in the patch metadata. |
| The MISP Modules website component contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the external tools management interface. The /external_tools/list endpoint returned stored API keys (the api_key field) in its JSON response via the ExternalTools model serializer. Additionally, the browser-based edit form pre-populated the API key input field with the stored credential value, exposing it in the DOM.
The /external_tools/list endpoint is accessible without authentication (the regression tests verify the response for both authenticated and unauthenticated clients), meaning any network-reachable client could retrieve the API keys for all configured external tools. These keys are used by the server to authenticate submissions to external analysis or enrichment services, so their disclosure allows an attacker to impersonate the MISP instance or directly access those external services.
The vulnerability also affected the edit workflow: the change_config endpoint previously required the API key to be present and non-empty on every save, forcing the key to round-trip through the client. The browser JavaScript stored the key in a reactive state object and updated the in-memory tool list with the credential value, further increasing the window of exposure in client-side memory and network traffic.
Affected component: the website sub-application of MISP Modules, specifically the external_tools module (serializer in models.py, list endpoint, and the external_tools_index.html template). The impact is limited to confidentiality of the stored API keys; no integrity or availability impact on the MISP Modules website itself is indicated by the patch. |
| The MISP Modules website component exposes external tool management endpoints (add, delete, change status, and change configuration) that did not enforce the optional administrator authentication policy. When ADMIN_PASSWORD was configured in the application environment, the module configuration endpoints correctly required an authenticated administrator session, but the external tools management handlers processed requests from anonymous users without any authorization check. An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the website could add arbitrary external tools, delete existing tools, toggle their active status, and modify their configurations including API keys and ingestion URLs. This inconsistency allowed bypass of the intended access control for the external tools management functionality. The vulnerability is conditional on ADMIN_PASSWORD being set; installations without an admin password intentionally permit open management access by design. The affected component is the external_tools Flask blueprint within the MISP Modules website application. |
| The Wikidata Lookup expansion module (wiki.py) in MISP misp-modules contained a SPARQL injection vulnerability. The handler function constructed a SPARQL query by directly concatenating the user-supplied text value into the query string without any escaping or parameterization: 'SELECT ?item WHERE { ?item rdfs:label"' + request.get("text") + '" @en }'. An authenticated MISP user with access to the module could supply a crafted text attribute value containing SPARQL syntax (quotes, closing braces, UNION, SERVICE, LIMIT, etc.) to alter the structure of the query sent to the Wikidata SPARQL endpoint. This could allow an attacker to modify the query logic, extract unintended data, or cause the query to fail in ways that expose internal error details. Additionally, the old error handling path formatted raw exception objects into the response string ('wikidata API not accessible {}'.format(e)), potentially leaking internal information such as proxy credentials, query contents, or response bodies. The module also used a spoofed browser user-agent string and the deprecated Wikidata endpoint. The vulnerability required authenticated access to the MISP instance and the ability to invoke the wiki expansion module with a text attribute. The impact is limited to manipulation of the enrichment query and potential disclosure of internal error details; it does not directly compromise the MISP server or its stored data. |
| The sourcecache expansion module in MISP Modules (misp-modules) contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. When a user with permission to create or modify attributes of type 'link' or 'url' submits an attribute value, the module passes the URL directly to its internal archiving function without any validation of the target address. An attacker can therefore craft a URL pointing to loopback addresses (e.g., 127.0.0.1), private network ranges, link-local addresses, or cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254). The MISP server will issue an HTTP request to that target and store the response body in the event, effectively exfiltrating data from internal services to the attacker through the MISP interface. Non-HTTP schemes such as file:// are also accepted, potentially allowing local file disclosure. The vulnerability requires an authenticated MISP user with the ability to create or edit attributes of the affected types. The security impact is information disclosure from internal services reachable by the MISP server, including sensitive data such as cloud credentials, internal application data, or local files. |
| MISP Guard, a proxy that enforces security policies on MISP feed data, contained an incomplete validation check for required taxonomy tags. When a feed event or its attributes carried tags belonging to a required taxonomy (for example, TLP), the guard only verified that at least one tag of that taxonomy matched the configured allowed list. It did not verify that every tag of the required taxonomy present on the event or attribute was in the allowed list. As a result, an event or attribute could simultaneously carry an allowed tag (e.g., tlp:clear) and a non-allowed tag (e.g., tlp:red or tlp:amber) and still pass the guard's policy check. This allowed data marked with a higher classification or sensitivity level to be distributed through feeds configured to only distribute lower-classification data, effectively bypassing the intended data-handling restrictions. The vulnerability affected both event-level and attribute-level tag validation, including attributes nested within objects and shadow attributes. An attacker with the ability to author or modify MISP events in a feed source could include non-allowed taxonomy tags alongside allowed ones to exfiltrate more sensitive data to feed consumers than the guard policy intended to permit. |
| MISP mispguard is a security filtering proxy that inspects and blocks MISP feed responses based on configured rules. The process_feed_response method in src/mispguard.py was responsible for evaluating feed responses before they reached the MISP instance. The original logic only explicitly handled the case where the HTTP status code was not 200 by passing the response through without filtering, on the assumption that non-200 responses would not carry ingestible event data. However, HTTP 2xx status codes other than 200 (such as 201 Created, 203 Non-Authoritative Information, and 206 Partial Content) were also passed through unfiltered. Because MISP may still ingest content from these responses, a malicious or compromised feed host could return a 203 or 206 status code with arbitrary content, effectively bypassing all of mispguard's filtering rules. This allowed unfiltered or malicious feed data to be ingested into the MISP instance, undermining the security controls that mispguard is designed to enforce. The vulnerability requires the attacker to control or compromise a feed endpoint configured in the MISP instance. No authentication or user interaction is required beyond the feed polling mechanism already in place. |
| MISP contains a vulnerability in its server settings lookup mechanism that allows an authenticated user to retrieve sensitive configuration data that should have been redacted.
The settings lookup function resolves a dotted setting name to a node in the configuration tree. When a branch name (such as Security, MISP, or Plugin) is supplied instead of a specific leaf setting, the function returns the entire sub-tree. Because a branch node does not carry a redaction flag, the redaction check in the settings retrieval endpoint is bypassed, and the full branch contents are returned to the caller. This exposes sensitive values including the security salt, Redis connection passwords, and plugin API keys.
A second endpoint that edits server settings similarly reads the entire configuration store when a branch name is resolved, returning all settings to the caller.
The impact is disclosure of sensitive server configuration secrets to any user who can access the server settings endpoints.
Affected versions: <2.5.48. |
| MISP Guard, a proxy-based security filter for MISP feed distribution, contains a case-sensitivity flaw in multiple policy enforcement checks. The functions check_required_taxonomy_exists, check_required_taxonomy_tags_allowed, check_blocked_attribute_categories, and check_blocked_analyst_data_sharing_groups_uuids performed case-sensitive string comparisons when matching event tags, attribute categories, and sharing-group UUIDs against configured allow/block lists.
An attacker with the ability to create or modify events in a MISP instance (or a connected instance that pushes events through the guard) could craft events using different letter case in taxonomy tag names, attribute categories, or sharing-group UUIDs to bypass the configured security policies. For example, if the policy requires the 'tlp' taxonomy with only 'tlp:clear' allowed, an event tagged 'TLP:AMBER' would not be recognized as belonging to the 'tlp' taxonomy and would therefore not be checked against the allowed-tags list, resulting in the event being forwarded to feed consumers. Similarly, a blocked attribute category such as 'Person' would not match a configured block entry of 'person', allowing the attribute to pass through the filter.
The security impact is unauthorized disclosure of threat-intelligence data that the operator intended to restrict. Events carrying non-allowed TLP (Traffic Light Protocol) markings, blocked attribute categories, or blocked sharing-group associations are forwarded to downstream feed consumers in violation of the configured distribution policy. This undermines the confidentiality controls that MISP Guard is designed to enforce.
The vulnerability is trivially exploitable: the attacker only needs to alter the letter case of a tag, category, or UUID string. No authentication beyond normal MISP event-creation privileges is required, and no user interaction is needed. |
| The html_to_markdown expansion module in MISP Modules contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in its is_safe_url() URL validation function. The BLOCKED_RANGES list used to reject unsafe destination addresses was incomplete, omitting several critical IP address ranges. Specifically, the following ranges were not blocked: 0.0.0.0/8 (unspecified, which routes to loopback on Linux), 100.64.0.0/10 (carrier-grade NAT per RFC 6598), ::/128 (IPv6 unspecified), fc00::/7 (IPv6 Unique Local Addresses), and fe80::/10 (IPv6 link-local). The existing list only covered IPv4 loopback (127.0.0.0/8), RFC 1918 private ranges, IPv4 link-local (169.254.0.0/16), and IPv6 loopback (::1/128).
An authenticated user with the ability to create or modify MISP attributes that trigger the html_to_markdown expansion module could supply URLs pointing to these unblocked internal address ranges. Because the module fetches the URL server-side to convert HTML content to Markdown, the request is made from the MISP server's network context. This allows an attacker to probe and read responses from internal services, carrier-grade NAT infrastructure, or link-local endpoints that would otherwise be unreachable from external networks. IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms (e.g., [::ffff:0.0.0.0]) also bypassed the existing checks.
The security impact is primarily confidentiality: an attacker can read data served by internal services reachable from the MISP server. The MISP instance itself is not compromised, but it is abused as a proxy to access otherwise restricted network resources. |
| In MISP, the event synchronization process contained a logic error in the preparation of event reports for remote push. The filtering of non-exportable tags was applied only once after the iteration over all reports, rather than to each individual report.
As a result:
- All reports except the last one in the set were pushed to the remote MISP instance with their non-exportable tags intact, effectively disclosing restricted tag information to the receiving instance.
- When the last report in the set was withheld (empty), a null report was pushed, causing the remote instance to fail saving the event.
This issue affects any MISP instance configured to push events with multiple reports to a remote server via synchronization.
Affected: <2.5.48. |
| MISP contains a vulnerability in the handling of module plugin settings. When the server rebuilds module-supplied settings for API consumption, it drops the redacted and cli_only flags that a module declares in its own configuration metadata.
As a result:
- A module that marks a setting (such as an API key) as redacted still has its value returned in full by the servers/getSetting and servers/serverSettingsEdit endpoints, exposing sensitive credentials to any authenticated user who can read server settings.
- A module that marks a setting as cli_only (intended to be editable only via the command-line interface) can still be modified through the web API, bypassing the intended access restriction.
An authenticated user with access to server settings can therefore read sensitive module credentials and modify settings that the module author intended to restrict to CLI-only access.
Affected: <2.5.48 |