Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: reclaim credits for decrypted reads with no matching mid

When a decrypted SMB2 READ response carries a MessageId that matches no
outstanding request, both the inline receive_encrypted_read() and the
offloaded smb2_decrypt_offload() paths drop the frame without accounting
the credits the server granted in it. The plaintext unknown-frame path in
cifs_demultiplex_thread() already reclaims them with
smb2_add_credits_from_hdr(), so encrypted reads leak credits that the
plaintext path would not.

This also happens for legitimate frames - e.g. a reply that arrives after
the client has timed out and dropped the mid - so over a long-lived
connection the client's credit count drifts down and can eventually starve
it of the ability to issue requests. The frame is AEAD-authenticated, so
the granted credits in the decrypted header come from the real server and
are safe to apply.

Reclaim the credits from the decrypted header before dropping the frame,
and export smb2_add_credits_from_hdr() so the SMB2 receive paths can use it.
Published: 2026-11-19
Score: n/a
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
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Remediation

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History

Thu, 19 Nov 2026 14:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: reclaim credits for decrypted reads with no matching mid When a decrypted SMB2 READ response carries a MessageId that matches no outstanding request, both the inline receive_encrypted_read() and the offloaded smb2_decrypt_offload() paths drop the frame without accounting the credits the server granted in it. The plaintext unknown-frame path in cifs_demultiplex_thread() already reclaims them with smb2_add_credits_from_hdr(), so encrypted reads leak credits that the plaintext path would not. This also happens for legitimate frames - e.g. a reply that arrives after the client has timed out and dropped the mid - so over a long-lived connection the client's credit count drifts down and can eventually starve it of the ability to issue requests. The frame is AEAD-authenticated, so the granted credits in the decrypted header come from the real server and are safe to apply. Reclaim the credits from the decrypted header before dropping the frame, and export smb2_add_credits_from_hdr() so the SMB2 receive paths can use it.
Title smb: client: reclaim credits for decrypted reads with no matching mid
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

Subscriptions

Linux Linux Kernel
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-11-19T14:38:32.927Z

Reserved: 2026-09-25T10:25:14.411Z

Link: CVE-2026-99383

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

No data.

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.

Weaknesses

No weakness.